Qualitative studies of vote buying find the practice to be common in many Latin American countries, but quantitative studies using surveys find little evidence of vote buying. Social desirability ...bias can account for this discrepancy. We employ a survey-based list experiment to minimize the problem. After the 2008 Nicaraguan municipal elections, we asked about vote-buying behavior by campaigns using a list experiment and the questions traditionally used by studies of vote buying on a nationally representative survey. Our list experiment estimated that 24% of registered voters in Nicaragua were offered a gift or service in exchange for votes, whereas only 2% reported the behavior when asked directly. This detected social desirability bias is nonrandom and analysis based on traditional obtrusive measures of vote buying is unreliable. We also provide systematic evidence that shows the importance of monitoring strategies by parties in determining who is targeted for vote buying.
Anti-vote-buying campaigns led by NGOs and political elites denounce the practice as a crass economic transaction detrimental to democracy. Do potential clients stigmatize vote buying to the same ...degree, or does the mass public have a more conditional view of the acceptability of vote buying? We theorize that normative evaluations of vote buying vary based on individuals' understanding of the transaction itself and abstract societal costs associated with the practice. We assess this perspective using survey experiments conducted in several Latin American countries that present hypothetical vote-buying situations for evaluation by respondents, varying the socioeconomic status of the hypothetical client and the client's political predispositions. We find that the disapproval of vote buying is highly conditional on the attributes of the hypothetical client and that evaluations of vote buying depend on conceptions of the concrete benefits and abstract costs of vote buying as a part of electoral politics.
We investigated the effects of Facebook's and Instagram's feed algorithms during the 2020 US election. We assigned a sample of consenting users to reverse-chronologically-ordered feeds instead of the ...default algorithms. Moving users out of algorithmic feeds substantially decreased the time they spent on the platforms and their activity. The chronological feed also affected exposure to content: The amount of political and untrustworthy content they saw increased on both platforms, the amount of content classified as uncivil or containing slur words they saw decreased on Facebook, and the amount of content from moderate friends and sources with ideologically mixed audiences they saw increased on Facebook. Despite these substantial changes in users' on-platform experience, the chronological feed did not significantly alter levels of issue polarization, affective polarization, political knowledge, or other key attitudes during the 3-month study period.
Carrots and sticks Ocantos, Ezequiel Gonzalez; de Jonge, Chad Kiewiet; Meléndez, Carlos ...
Journal of peace research,
01/2020, Letnik:
57, Številka:
1
Journal Article
Recenzirano
Odprti dostop
How do parties target intimidation and vote-buying during elections? Parties prefer the use of carrots over sticks because they are in the business of getting voters to like them and expect higher ...legitimacy costs if observers expose intimidation. However, their brokers sometimes choose intimidation because it is cheaper and possibly more effective than vote-buying. Specifically, we contend that brokers use intimidation when the cost of buying votes is prohibitively high; in interactions with voters among whom the commitment problem inherent to clientelistic transactions is difficult to overcome; and in contexts where the risk of being denounced for violence is lower. We probe our hypotheses about the different profile of voters targeted with vote-buying and intimidation using two list experiments included in an original survey conducted during the 2011 Guatemalan general elections. The list experiments were designed to overcome the social desirability bias associated with direct questions about illegal or stigmatized behaviors. Our quantitative analysis is supplemented by interviews with politicians from various parties. The analysis largely confirms our expectations about the diametrically opposed logics of vote-buying and intimidation targeting, and illuminates how both are key components of politics in a country with weak parties and high levels of violence.
Does Facebook enable ideological segregation in political news consumption? We analyzed exposure to news during the US 2020 election using aggregated data for 208 million US Facebook users. We ...compared the inventory of all political news that users could have seen in their feeds with the information that they saw (after algorithmic curation) and the information with which they engaged. We show that (i) ideological segregation is high and increases as we shift from potential exposure to actual exposure to engagement; (ii) there is an asymmetry between conservative and liberal audiences, with a substantial corner of the news ecosystem consumed exclusively by conservatives; and (iii) most misinformation, as identified by Meta's Third-Party Fact-Checking Program, exists within this homogeneously conservative corner, which has no equivalent on the liberal side. Sources favored by conservative audiences were more prevalent on Facebook's news ecosystem than those favored by liberals.
We studied the effects of exposure to reshared content on Facebook during the 2020 US election by assigning a random set of consenting, US-based users to feeds that did not contain any reshares over ...a 3-month period. We find that removing reshared content substantially decreases the amount of political news, including content from untrustworthy sources, to which users are exposed; decreases overall clicks and reactions; and reduces partisan news clicks. Further, we observe that removing reshared content produces clear decreases in news knowledge within the sample, although there is some uncertainty about how this would generalize to all users. Contrary to expectations, the treatment does not significantly affect political polarization or any measure of individual-level political attitudes.
While political campaigns commonly employ clientelistic mobilization tactics during elections in developing countries, studying vote buying with mass surveys has proven difficult since respondents ...often will not admit to receiving a gift or favor in exchange for their votes. This study explores the degree to which respondents vary in their reporting of the receipt of goods or favors. Analysis of list experiments included in 10 surveys conducted in eight Latin American countries demonstrates the widespread prevalence of underreporting and shows that it is best predicted by three different sources of question sensitivity. First, bias is greater among respondents with higher levels of education, likely due to greater understanding and awareness of democratic norms about vote buying. Second, since vote buying is often stigmatized as resulting from poverty, those who are particularly sensitive to questions about income also prove to be much more likely to edit their answers. Finally, bias is positively associated with the degree to which the goods distributed violate democratic norms, as bias is smallest in countries in which the gifts consist largely of innocuous campaign materials and items such as clothing and food. The results not only point to probable biases in analyses conducted using direct measures of gift dispensation, but also illuminate how social attitudes about vote buying have spread in different countries in Latin America.
Remittances and Vote Buying González-Ocantos, Ezequiel; de Jonge, Chad Kiewiet; Meseguer, Covadonga
Latin American research review,
12/2018, Letnik:
53, Številka:
4
Journal Article
Recenzirano
Odprti dostop
How does the presence of a large group of remittance recipients in the electorate affect the way political parties in Latin America plan their vote-buying operations during electoral campaigns? ...Existing research claims that remittances bolster the political autonomy of recipients, allowing them to escape clientelistic networks and making them less attractive targets from the point of view of party machines. Although in the long run remittances may undermine the effectiveness of clientelistic inducements, parties still have strong incentives to distribute gifts and favors among these voters. Cross-national survey evidence and an original list experiment fielded in the aftermath of El Salvador’s 2014 presidential race support the view that remittances alter key attitudes and patterns of political behavior among recipients in ways that are relevant for the electoral strategies of party machines. In particular, remittance recipients are appealing targets for clientelistic exchanges due to the uncertainty of their turnout propensity and their distributive preferences.
¿Cómo impacta la presencia de un grupo considerable en el electorado que recibe remesas en la forma en la que los partidos políticos latinoamericanos diseñan estrategias de compra de voto en períodos electorales? Los estudios sobre el tema argumentan que las remesas aumentan la autonomía política de quienes las reciben, permitiéndoles escapar de las redes clientelares y haciéndolos menos atractivos desde el punto de vista de las maquinarias partidarias. Si bien es posible que en el largo plazo las remesas socaven la efectividad de las transferencias clientelares, sostenemos que los partidos enfrentan fuertes incentivos para continuar distribuyendo regalos y favores entre estos votantes. Utilizamos encuestas de opinión pública de corte transversal y un experimento de lista llevado a cabo luego de la elección presidencial del 2014 en El Salvador para mostrar que las remesas alteran posturas y comportamientos políticos relevantes para las estrategias de distribución de los partidos políticos. Específicamente, los receptores de remesas son blancos atractivos para intercambios clientelares debido a la incertidumbre sobre su propensión a participar en elecciones y a sus preferencias distributivas.
We study the effect of Facebook and Instagram access on political beliefs, attitudes, and behavior by randomizing a subset of 19,857 Facebook users and 15,585 Instagram users to deactivate their ...accounts for 6 wk before the 2020 U.S. election. We report four key findings. First, both Facebook and Instagram deactivation reduced an index of political participation (driven mainly by reduced participation online). Second, Facebook deactivation had no significant effect on an index of knowledge, but secondary analyses suggest that it reduced knowledge of general news while possibly also decreasing belief in misinformation circulating online. Third, Facebook deactivation may have reduced self-reported net votes for Trump, though this effect does not meet our preregistered significance threshold. Finally, the effects of both Facebook and Instagram deactivation on affective and issue polarization, perceived legitimacy of the election, candidate favorability, and voter turnout were all precisely estimated and close to zero.
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