What Limits Social Spending? Lindert, Peter H.
Explorations in economic history,
January 1996, 1996, 1996-01-00, 19960101, Letnik:
33, Številka:
1
Journal Article
Recenzirano
The forces that are most likely to set the ultimate limits on social spending as a share of GDP are not those usually imagined. The deadweight costs of such spending, and the taxes behind them, fail ...to show the predicted upward spiral. The experience of 1960–1981 shows a major role for shifts in relative age-group sizes, but with an approaching sunset to the effect of aging on social-spending patterns. In addition, the further are the middle pre-fisc income ranks from the poor, the lower the political tendency to spend on any major type of social program.
This paper provides evidence that suggests that financial repression has substantial direct effects on financial development, independently of its well-known influence through the level of the real ...interest rate. It also demonstrates that the process of economic growth is not weakly exogenous with respect to financial development. Thus financial repression may impose real costs that are additional to those suggested by previous empirical studies.
In the contemporary motion picture industry, production is vertically disintegrated, organized around transactions among a network of small firms. In this regard, motion picture production resembles ...other industries whose production organizations can be characterized as flexibly specialized. In this theoretically informed case study, we trace the transformation of the industry from vertically integrated to vertically disintegrated flexibly specialized production and elucidate how this transformation affects the spatial location of production activities and labor market dynamics.
The Devolution of Declining Industries Ghemawat, Pankaj; Nalebuff, Barry
The Quarterly journal of economics,
02/1990, Letnik:
105, Številka:
1
Journal Article
Recenzirano
In declining industries capacity must be reduced in order to restore profitability. Who bears this burden? Where production is all or nothing, there is a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium: the ...largest firms exit first Ghemawat and Nalebuff, 1985. In this paper firms continuously adjust capacity. Again, there is a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium. All else equal, large firms reduce capacity first, and continue to do so until they shrink to the size of their formerly smaller rivals. Intuitively, bigger firms have lower marginal revenue and correspondingly greater incentives to reduce capacity. This prediction is supported by empirical findings.
Using a generalized asymmetric adjustment function including both costs of changing employment (net changes) and costs of hiring or firing (gross changes), we derive the profit-maximizing path of ...employment demand and the Euler equation whose parameters we estimate. Identifying the two types of costs requires complete data on turnover, which were available for US manufacturing through 1981 and which demonstrate that both types of costs are needed to track aggregate employment fluctuations if one assumes that costs are symmetric. Allowing for asymmetry, the apparent importance of variations in the turnover rate disappears.
Between 1960 and 1981 there was a very substantial increase in female enrolment and a move towards a much lessened degree of gender inequality in tertiary education in most advanced industrial ...societies. Seeks to locate the main determinants of cross-national variance in gender inequality at both time points and of change across time. (Abstract amended)
