The rigid Constitutions should be modified only by means of the amendment or revision process they envisage to. Analysts, however, identify a number of constitutional amendments that do not follow ...this script, not changing, even, its normative text. These are the so-called “informal changes” or “mutations” of Constitution. In the Welfare State, the Legislative and the Executive play an extremely active role in the adoption of laws, regulations and measures that, under the pretext of implementing the Constitution, modify it. It is expected that the judiciary will correct any excesses or deviations, but this expectation is not always confirmed, either because it does not identify any problem, or because these changes are not questioned in the courts.
Niedawne 20-lecie uchwalenia i wejścia w życie Konstytucji RP z 1997 r. skłania do refleksji nad Konstytucją i treścią jej zapisów. Jak się wydaje, najważniejszymi elementami przepisów tej ...Konstytucji jest wprowadzenie katalogu podstawowych praw i wolności człowieka i obywatela, stworzenie podstaw funkcjonowania państwa, jakimi są zasady ustrojowe, oraz niekiedy bardzo szczegółowe określenie roli i wzajemnych relacji najważniejszych organów władzy publicznej.
The constitutional reform by which in 2011 Spain amended Article 135 of the Constitution is the topic of this article. By such an amendment the principle of financial and budgetary stability as well ...as a strict control over the budget of public administration and the devolved regional institutions (Comunidades Autonomas) has been introduced. All this amounts to severe limitations on the structural deficit. In fact, this reform has brought about a strengthening of the supervisory powers of the State over policies which the Constitution confers to the Comunidades Autonomas as well as clamping down on their financial autonomy. The thrust of the article is to show how, in time of crisis, the “financial constitution” changes its structure to adapt to the inputs coming from European rules and the financial markets. España, en el año 2011, modificó el artículo 135 de su Constitución para introducir el principio de Estabilidad Presupuestaria y un intenso control sobre los presupuestos de todas las Administraciones Públicas nacionales, incluidas, en particular, las Comunidades Autónomas, para garantizar las finanzas nacionales y, también, para limitar el gasto público y el déficit estructural. La reforma constitucional ha producido una fuerte centralización del marco normativo en tema de gasto y presupuesto, un renovado papel desempeñado por parte del Estado en función de «control» sobre la autonomía financiera autonómica y la compresión de dicha autonomía financiera, cerrada entre las estrictas normas constitucionales (y su desarrollo posterior mediante una Ley Orgánica) y el control ejercitado por parte del Estado central.
What legitimates constitutions? One standard answer is that constitutions are legitimate only if they represent the people they govern. This article identifies two different conceptions of ...representation. Representation can be grounded either in the consent or the will of the citizens or when the constitution reflects the ‘real’ identity of the members of the nation. Alternatively, it is sometimes stated that the constitution is legitimate because it promotes justice or, more generally, is grounded in reason. While constitutions are typically grounded both in claims to represent the people and in claims concerning the justness and wisdom of the constitutional provisions, we establish that there are two types of constitutions: constitutions that are primarily representational (e.g. the US Constitution) and constitutions that are primarily reason-based (e.g. the German Constitution). We also show that this distinction has important ramifications for how constitutions are drafted and ratified, and how they operate. One central implication is that the legitimacy of constitutions that make weak claims to representation – for example, constitutions that are imposed by foreign powers – can still be defended on reason-based grounds.
Comparison and contrasting of views on constitutional law of James Bryce and Albert Venn Dicey - importance of Bryce's views on the importance of responsible government and judicial review to ...development of constitutional structure - theoretical implications of the American Constitution for Australian constitutional law.
Assessment of the democratic legitimacy of the constitution-making process for the Cook Islands and Niue - New Zealand's role in the decolonisation process - Constitutions of Cook Islands and Niue - ...case studies on the constitutional experiences of Cook Islands and Niue - future decolonising model.
Article V of the Constitution allows two-thirds majorities of both houses of Congress to propose amendments to the document and a three-fourths majority of the states to ratify them. Scholars and ...frustrated advocates of constitutional change have often criticized this process for being too difficult. Despite this, state legislatures have yet to use the other primary method that Article V outlines for proposing amendments: it permits two-thirds of the state legislatures to petition Congress to call a convention to propose amendments that, like those proposed by Congress, must be ratified by three-fourths of the states. In this book, John R. Vile surveys more than two centuries of scholarship on Article V and concludes that the weight of the evidence (including a much-overlooked Federalist essay) indicates that states and Congress have the legal right to limit the scope of such conventions to a single subject and that political considerations would make a runaway convention unlikely. Charting a prudent course between those who fail to differentiate revolutionary change from constitutional change, those who fear ever using the Article V convention mechanism that the Framers clearly envisioned, and those who would vest total control of the convention in Congress, the states, or thebconvention itself, VileÆs work will enhance modern debates on the subject.