Tema rada je tretman političkoga tjednika Danas Predsjedništva Centralnoga komiteta Saveza komunista Hrvatske u prvoj godini njegova izlaženja, tijekom 1982. i 1983. Danas je počeo izlaziti u drugoj ...polovini veljače 1982., a već pola godine poslije postao je krupan politički problem. Tjednik se pojavio u razdoblju opće krize, s kritičkim, na trenutke i provokativnim pristupom izazvao je okoštalu i ostarjelu partijsku elitu odlučnu da brani svoj nedodirljivi položaj. U vrlo kratkom vremenu ustalio se na nakladi od oko 120.000 prodanih primjeraka, što svjedoči o njegovoj privlačnosti širokoj čitalačkoj populaciji, a s druge strane i utjecaju, što je zapravo zabrinjavalo partijski vrh. Pojavom Danasa počelo je nastajati kritičko javno mnijenje u socijalističkoj Hrvatskoj, što je dotad u većoj mjeri bila značajka Slovenije i Srbije. U obračun s tjednikom partijski vrh krenuo je u ljeto 1982. i privremeno ga je primirio početkom sljedeće godine. To je učinjeno smjenom glavnoga i odgovornoga urednika te dovođenjem novoga s mlađim pomoćnicima koji su bili na službenoj partijskoj liniji. Rezultat promjena bio je i drastičan pad naklade, što je tjednik doslovno svelo na životarenje i marginalan utjecaj.
The subject of this paper is the way the weekly Danas was treated by the Presidency of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Croatia in the first year of its publication, during 1982 and 1983. Danas started being published in the second half of February 1982 and half a year later the periodical turned into a huge political issue. The newspaper appeared at a time of a general crisis; with its critical approach, at times even provocative, it frustrated the hardened and obsolete party elite which was determined to defend its hitherto inviolable position. Within a short period of time, the weekly attained a circulation of 120,000 copies, which testifies to its wide appeal as well as to its influence, which in fact distressed the party leadership. With the appearance of Danas, a critical public opinion started to come into being. The party leadership started to deal with the weekly in the summer of 1982 and temporarily discontinued it at the beginning of the following year. This was done by the replacement of the editor-in-chief with a new one, along with young associates who were willing to toe the party line. The result of the changes was a drop in circulation, which literally reduced the weekly to eking out an existence and having only marginal influence. The penalization of Danas was in fact an example of shutting down any public opinion unacceptable to the party leadership, through the principle of democratic centralism and its concrete implementation in practice. It was actually a conflict within the party in which lower-ranking communists lost out.
The attitude of the new authorities in Yugoslavia (and Bosnia and Herzegovina) towards the officials of the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina, from the end of the Second World War to 1963, ...especially the state policy of separating „reactionary“ from „positive“ officials of this community, seems to be of the most important segments for the overall understanding of communist policy towards religious communities. So far, we cannot boast of fundamental work on this issue, not only because the original archival material is scarce, but also because there was a lack of good will to explain this problem factually and comprehensively. The issue of separating the „positive“ from the „reactionary“ officials of the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been the subject of continuous attention of the federal and republican commissions for religious affairs, as well as other authorities that more or less participated in creating and implementing state policy towards religious communities, including the Islamic Community. This paper contextualises the legal and political post-war circumstances in which the Islamic Community operated and analyses the manifestations and effects of the communist policy of establishing differentiation among the officials of this community. Religious rights and freedoms prescribed by the federal and republican constitutions did not simultaneously imply their concrete implementation in practice. The practical application of religious rights and freedoms on the ground largely depended on the will of party organisations and their political goals. In the category of those who should be disempowered, the communist government included the Islamic Community, which according to the ideological views of this government should have been economically weakened by a series of restrictive laws. That is why, in the first months after its liberation, AVNOJ'S Yugoslavia began to speed up the adoption of legal regulations that limited the property and rights of religious communities, including the Islamic Community. The new government did not respect the specific elements of religious communities, treating them in exactly the same way as other landowners and private entrepreneurs. By 1963, the communist government had adopted a set of legal regulations on the basis of which the state proceeded to confiscate the property of the Islamic Community through legal mechanisms of confiscation, nationalisation, sequestration and expropriation. Along with the disempowerment measures, the measures to bring this community under control by the government were also applied. For this purpose, the policy of separating „reactionary“ from „positive“ officials of the Islamic Community was used, among other things. Numerous reports, analyses and letters from the Commission for Religious Affairs pointed out that, unlike the leading representatives of the Islamic Community in the lower structures of this community, the readiness to cooperate with the authorities was not at such a level. Due to such assessments, the Commission considered that the officials of the Islamic Community on the ground were for the most part „reactionary“, and that „in a sense there is a danger of separating the top“ from the lower officials of this community. Numerous materials from the Commission on Religious Affairs from the 1950s and early 1960s stated that there were still „reactionary elements“ within the Islamic Community who were opposed to the socialist social order. However, especially since the late 1950s, it has been pointed out that such individuals are few and are unable to have any decisive influence on members of the Islamic community. Therefore, the governing structures in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the late 1950s stated that in general it can be concluded that the situation in the Islamic Community is „very favourable“. In their opinion, the officials and the vast majority of officials are patriotic and willing to cooperate, as well as to accept all proposals that are in accordance with the Constitution and laws. The state policy of awarding decorations was also in the function of supporting and affirming the „positive“ officials of the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Despite its good geographical position and connections with the developed Danube region, the system of work in the Port of Rijeka and the changes conditioned by the economic reform and the fierce ...competition influenced by the oversizing of port capacities in the country affected the financial and economic results of this company. Technical backwardness, the poor qualification structure of employees, and large redundancies of administrative workers were just some of the problems that burdened the port. Asking for help, in 1968 the company’s management turned to municipal, republican, and federal bodies, commercial banks, and the Chamber of Commerce. As there was no positive response to the stated requests, a way out of the difficulties was sought in a programme of economic measures that further lowered the living standard of employees. Dissatisfied workers responded to the austerity measures with a strike. Work was suspended on Sunday, 1 June 1969, at the initiative of 10 to 15 workers. Although the entire weekly shift ceased working, there was no indication that the dissatisfaction would turn into an open revolt, and then into a riot in which the general and commercial directors, chief accountant, analyst, director of economics, and president of the trade union were injured. The police took to the streets, and the authorities did everything to end the strike and at least temporarily eliminate the workers’ dissatisfaction. The austerity measures were abandoned, and the workers promised to work on Sundays in order to make up for what they had lost. Those employees who were considered the leaders of the protest had to bear the legal consequences. Criminal charges were filed against 20 people, investigations were opened against 14, and six people were detained.
The paper is focused on Slovene and Serbian state socialist experts and their role in the scientific field of researching the Yugoslav national question in the first half of the 1960s, with emphasis ...on their research and debates regarding the concept of national Yugoslavism. The institutes being examined are the Institute for Ethnic Studies (Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, INV) in Ljubljana and the Institute of Social Sciences (Institut društvenih nauka, IDN) in Belgrade. In the early 1960s, Yugoslav soft nation-building reached its peak with the famous Ćosić-Pirjevec debate. The latter coincided with the end of the 'transitional period' at INV and its new leadership under Drago Druškovič. Some Serbian lawyers shifted the fight for the establishment of a socialist Yugoslav nation from political debates to the Yugoslav Association for International Law, where the dispute reached a climax in late 1964. With the abandonment of the Yugoslav national idea, IDN prepared an ambitious programme of researching Yugoslav interethnic relations, which would include several institutions from all Yugoslav republics. The League of Communists of Yugoslavia financed research on interethnic relations in Yugoslavia to create 'correct' policies with regard to the national question. Huge amounts of data were collected (public opinion polls, newspaper clippings) and analysed by the research institutions mentioned earlier, which often gave expert opinions to leading Communists. In the late 1960s, amateur research and opinion polling conducted by Yugoslav newspapers challenged the monopoly of the Party on the scientific research field of interethnic relations. Thus, in the early 1970s, the Party struggled to retake control.
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