In Euromissile
s, Susan Colbourn tells the story of the height of nuclear
crisis and the remarkable waning of the fear that gripped the
globe. In the Cold War conflict that pitted nuclear
superpowers ...against one another, Europe was the principal
battleground. Washington and Moscow had troops on the ground and
missiles in the fields of their respective allies, the NATO nations
and the states of the Warsaw Pact. Euromissiles-intermediate-range
nuclear weapons to be used exclusively in the regional theater of
war-highlighted how the peoples of Europe were dangerously placed
between hammer and anvil. That made European leaders uncomfortable
and pushed fearful masses into the streets demanding peace in their
time. At the center of the story is NATO. Colbourn highlights the
weakness of the alliance seen by many as the most effective bulwark
against Soviet aggression. Divided among themselves and uncertain
about the depth of US support, the member states were riven by the
missile issue. This strategic crisis was, as much as any summit
meeting between US president Ronald Reagan and Soviet general
secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, the hinge on which the Cold War
turned. Euromissiles is a history of diplomacy and
alliances, social movements and strategy, nuclear weapons and
nagging fears, and politics. To tell that history, Colbourn takes a
long view of the strategic crisis-from the emerging dilemmas of
allied defense in the early 1950s through the aftermath of the INF
Treaty thirty-five years later. The result is a dramatic and
sweeping tale that changes the way we think about the Cold War and
its culmination.
This paper is an analysis of the Ukraine crisis in 2014 evolving to 2022 as the prelude to the Russia-Ukraine fullfledged war that started in February 2022. The escalating conflict between Russia and ...Ukraine has reverberated beyond their borders, with the active involvement of key international actors such as the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the United States (US) in the conflict zone. Notably, the President of Russia, Vladimir Putin, visited the Kherson and Luhansk regions, further exacerbating tensions in the area. Preceding these events, Russia organized a referendum on 20 September in Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson, wherein enthusiasm for joining the Russian Federation was expressed. These developments are perceived as manifestations of Russia’s dissatisfaction with Ukraine’s political decisions. The conflict’s initiation in 2022 can be attributed to Ukraine’s aspirations to align itself with NATO and the EU, which sparked Russia’s aggressive actions. Despite Ukraine’s efforts to regain control of Crimea and restore its sovereignty, exemplified by the formation of the Crimea Platform at its first Summit in 2021 with the backing of the EU and NATO, the situation has escalated into a full-scale war. By examining the sequence of events and the underlying geopolitical dynamics, this paper aims to shed light on the complexities of the Russia-Ukraine conflict and its shift into a catastrophic war. The findings contribute to a deeper understanding of the interplay between political decisions, regional ambitions, and the global ramifications of military aggression in contemporary international conflicts.
Even though Turkey was a member of NATO during the Cold War years, its geostrategic importance was far behind its size and the number of its military. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, Turkey's ...foreign policy and strategic doctrine gradually opened up, the country became an increasingly active participant in international armed conflicts, and after a while it aspired to a distinctly regional leadership role. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan treats the transatlantic alliance more and more only as a security guarantee, and based on this he targets his personal and national ambitions. The purpose of the article called Re-Visiting Turkish National Security Strategy After the Cold War is to provide a qualitative analysis of this process with the help of international literature.
This scholarly article examines the continued existence of NATO after the end of the Cold War. Despite the disappearance of its primary adversary, the Soviet Union, NATO has continued to exist. The ...conventional neorealist explanation for the alliance’s longevity, which states that NATO was established as a counterbalance to the Soviet Union and thus should have been dissolved upon its collapse, is challenged by the constructivist perspective. Constructivism argues that NATO persists as a result of the desire of liberal democracies to cooperate for the sake of peace and the influence of member states’ collective identities. However, this constructivist explanation is criticized for being predicated on a specific understanding of NATO and for neglecting the crucial role of the United States in sustaining the alliance. This study contends that offensive neorealism, which takes into account the role of the United States in a value-neutral way, offers the most comprehensive explanation for NATO’s persistence after 1991.
Abstract The western response to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 was unprecedented. The states of the European Union, the G7 and NATO have targeted Russia with sanctions and ...diplomatic isolation, and furnished Ukraine with military assistance sufficient to ensure the Zelensky regime's survival. These efforts have proven insufficient to dislodge Russia from its occupation of Ukrainian territory. Nonetheless, when launched in the aftermath of the invasion, they were seen (and often justified as) as bold, innovative, and steadfast—a necessary response to a grievous act. What explains this response? In this article we argue that the answer lies in the emotions of guilt and shame for past actions and mistakes in the West's dealings with Russia and Ukraine. Informed by a qualitative discourse analysis of key speeches, statements and interviews with leading western policy-makers (past and present), we regard these two emotions—expressed as apologies and the acknowledgment of mistakes—as important drivers of policy. This article contributes to the bourgeoning literature on emotions in world politics. In addition to offering a coherent explanation of the West's unprecedented response our argument has policy implications. While the admission of wrongdoing is laudable, it can lead to actors overcompensating, resulting in further mistakes and policy failures. Fast-tracking Ukraine into the European Union would be one such error.
Denne artikel fremhæver tre nøgleaspekter af den vestlige tilpasning til Ruslands krig mod Ukraine og giver bud på, hvordan de fælles politikker kan optimeres fremover. Det første er den forestående ...styrkelse af NATOs konventionelle forsvar mod Rusland, hvis bæredygtighed imidlertid vil afhænge af europæiske bidrag, efterhånden som USA fokuserer mere på Asien. Det andet er bevarelsen af den fælles robusthed over for både Rusland og Kina, hvor NATO bør holde sig til det snævre militære aspekt, og EU til det bredere civile aspekt. Det tredje er spørgsmålet om Ukraine som en del af Vesten, hvor førstnævntes ringe reformfremskridt og sidstnævntes manglende vilje til at intervenere militært tegner det realistiske scenarie af landets fortsatte associering med Vesten.
This article highlights three key areas of Western adaptation to Russia’s war against Ukraine with advice for how to optimize them going forward. First is the immediate strengthening of NATO’s ...conventional defense against Russia, whose sustainability will depend on European contributions, as the US increasingly will focus on Asia. Second is the preservation of joint resilience against both Russia and China, in which NATO should stick to the narrow military areas and the EU to the broader civilian areas. Third is the question of Ukraine as part of the West, where the former’s poor reform record and the latter’s unwillingness to intervene militarily on its behalf draw the realistic scenario of the country’s continued association.
This book aims to trace the different directions that Russia has taken after initiating its full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. The authors, coming from positions of policy, academia, ...and practice, employ a transdisciplinary approach to critically engage the question of how Russia as an actor will develop in such an altered paradigm through three lines of argumentation. The first of these themes is centred on Russia’s relations with other major powers and how these ligatures might condition future developments in a global perspective. The second topic relates the effect of the ‘Russian idea’ on domestic dynamics within Russia, as well as with how it has coloured understandings of Russia in the West. Finally, the authors discuss possible future weaknesses for Russia and question whether they will actually be as serious as previously thought. While no singular to the guiding answer can be posited, these dialogues nonetheless contribute to building a solid foundation for discussions within and between transatlantic capitals as well as globally.
