Despite the unprecedented level of cooperation and support behind defending Ukraine, no criteria or timeline for Ukraine's accession to NATO were established at the July 2024 NATO summit in ...Washington. Meanwhile, the window for Ukraine's accession may be closing as NATO member states become more risk averse and transatlantic support for Ukraine more brittle. Establishing the sequence of developments that would make membership ripe would at least restore NATO's control over the process. NATO could explicitly frame the membership option as integral to ending the war and bringing security and stability to the region. Senior officials would need to present a clear account of how and under what assumptions Ukraine's membership in NATO could come about. The West Germany model, though it would not be easy to digest or implement, remains the most plausible one.
The article explores the key issues of NATO agenda in connection with the Alliance 2019 anniversary Summit in Watford, UK. On the eve of the summit, French President E. Macron made a harsh criticism ...on NATO, calling to deal with its «brain death», owing to the Alliance no longer provides the necessary level of strategic communications and coordination. At the same time, the President of Turkey R. Erdoğan fixed his «special position» towards NATO, demanding its country’s security interests to be taken duly considered within the collective framework. Germany has confirmed that it is not ready to reach a 2% defense spending of GDP by 2024, pushing back the deadline by another five years. The outcomes of the summit is considered in this context of aggravating transatlantic differences.
The article analyzes the main political outcomes of the NATO summit in Brussels on June 14, 2021. The summit, which was attended by US President Joe Biden, was initially seen as a «return» of the ...United States to Europe – after a turbulent «Trumpism» period in transatlantic relations. The final communiqué constitutes the main lines of the planned Alliance’s transformation in response to the growing challenges to Euro-Atlantic security, in particular raised by Russia and China, and by of international terrorism threats as well. The in-depth register of NATO’s potential and actions in response to the growing challenges and threats, presented in the meeting’s communiqué, proves a trend towards the alliance globalization, both in functional and geopolitical terms. The Summit decisions, its adoption of the «NATO 2030» platform, are seen as a basis of a new strategic concept, planned to be adopted at the next 2022 summit in Spain. However, the author arguing, the postponed problems of transatlantic relations and allies disagreements will inevitably constitute a significant internal challenge for the alliance in the search for its future «globalization» strategy.
This paper presents two-step GMM panel estimates of NATO allies' demand for defense spending during 1968–2015, 1991–2015, and 1999–2015. A novel feature of our NATO estimates is the spatial ...autoregressive (SAR) weighting of alliance spillovers of defense spending based on ally contiguity (augmented by US defense spending) and inverse distance between allies. The spatial models provide defense demand estimates that are amazingly consistent with those of the standard spillover model. In particular, free riding is prevalent in all three sets of estimates for the three sample periods and changing set of allies. In addition, the influences of the controls are generally robust, including the effect of the change in strategic doctrine in 1975 that augmented the importance of conventional weapons and, thus, spatial factors. We also present mutual assured destruction (MAD) era defense demand estimations dating back to 1960 and 1950 to show that spatial-based spillovers only matter in the post-MAD era after 1974.
•We present the first spatial-based defense demands for NATO allies.•Free riding is prevalent for alternative spatial-based demand estimates after 1967.•Spatial spillovers are shown not to matter when NATO relied on nuclear weapons to deter aggression.•NATO post-1998 entrants are not responding to the threat posed by Russian military expenditures.•Transnational terrorist attacks against allies influence their defense spending after 1991.
This article investigates the ways in which education and military training can contribute to enhancing the operational capabilities of armed forces involved in international missions under the ...auspices of NATO. Through an analytical approach, which combined literature review, analysis of official documents, and mission analysis, the main challenges and opportunities regarding the optimization of education and training processes within NATO have been identified. Additionally, recommendations have been proposed for strengthening partnerships and exchanging best practices among member states and international organizations to improve military personnel readiness and promote a culture of continuous learning within the armed forces. This research provides a critical perspective on the role of military education and training within NATO and proposes solutions for optimizing armed forces preparedness processes in the current context of global security.
Nach den nuklearen Drohungen des russischen Präsidenten Putin im Zuge des Ukraine-Kriegs halten viele NATO-Mitgliedstaaten es für notwendig, die Wirksamkeit des Systems der nuklearen Abschreckung zu ...überprüfen und einen Reformprozess einzuleiten. Dafür wären Natur, Aufgaben und Reformbedarf der erweiterten nuklearen Abschreckung zu untersuchen. Da das gegenwärtige Dispositiv der NATO den Bedrohungsstand der 90er- und frühen 2000er-Jahre reflektiert, muss man zunächst die heutigen Aufgaben erweiterter nuklearer Abschreckung durch die USA in Europa benennen und Kriterien definieren, um beurteilen zu können, ob eine Abschreckungswirkung erreicht wird. Die bestehenden, im Rahmen der nuklearen Teilhabe in Europa stationierten Fähigkeiten erfüllen generell den Zweck der Abschreckung, allerdings nur im Verbund mit den strategischen Kapazitäten der USA, Frankreichs und Großbritanniens. Es gilt, ihre Verwundbarkeit für Präemptivschläge zu verringern und das Spektrum an Nuklearwaffen und Trägermitteln zu verbreitern. So wichtig neben der Hardware die Software der erweiterten Abschreckung ist, so sinnvoll wäre eine höhere Anzahl von NATO-Mitgliedstaaten, die auf die eine oder andere Weise an der nuklearen Teilhabe mitwirken. Auch sollte die NATO vehementer ihre deklaratorische Politik akzentuieren. Ein großes Hindernis für eine angemessene Reform ist indes die Weigerung vieler europäischer Regierungen, sich einer innenpolitischen Debatte über Notwendigkeit und Voraussetzungen nuklearer Abschreckung zu stellen.
Without security guarantees, Ukraine will not have a free and secure future. Despite the urgency of the issue, however, no clarity has so far arisen on the nature of security guarantees that might ...apply, their institutional context or their timeline. Giving Ukraine such guarantees sooner rather than later would send a message to Moscow that the West was in the war for the long haul, and that continuing a losing war was futile. Accordingly, guarantees should be shaped in parallel with Ukraine's counter-offensive. The best option appears to be a security pact for Ukraine outside the NATO institutional context. While such a pact would not necessarily contemplate NATO membership, it would extend practically comparable assurances to Kyiv through a formalised support structure without leaving it vulnerable in the short term.
PDF
