Among the multiple dimensions of the tous azimuths modernisation of Chinese naval forces, the development of China's anti-access capacity has recently elicited considerable interest. The important ...link between this capacity and an overarching vision of the use of force - i.e. a naval doctrine - has, however, often been left implicit. This article shows that the particular development of China's naval anti-access forces - more precisely, forces with an impact on the naval balance - can be explained by a shift of China's naval doctrine towards a distinctly pre-emptive posture, which, itself, stems from the set of constraints imposed by the framework of 'local war under informationised conditions'.
This article examines the security and defense discourse in the United States on China's ambitious naval development in the Asia‐Pacific region. American scholars and experts highlight four ...motivations for Chinese naval development: (1) the consolidation of China's territorial sovereignty; (2) the feasibility of A2/AD strategy; (3) the protection of China's overseas interests; and (4) leadership endorsement. Xi Jinping has increased the quality and quantity of China's naval capabilities and attempted to enhance his prestige by portraying himself as the driving force behind the development of China's powerful navy. Since then, the United States has not merely watched China's naval development but has considered China's navy a rival force. There are multiple ongoing debates regarding the purpose of China's naval development, including whether China aims to challenge US maritime supremacy. Some scholars are focused on China's territorial and strategic motivation, inferring the aim of posing a direct threat to US national security, but China posits that its purpose for naval development is not to confront US maritime hegemony. Some believe that the Chinese navy is not capable of doing so, and others explain that China is not aiming for a military crusade capable of causing a power transition, but rather focusing on the expansion of maritime interests.
A truism in strategic studies holds that warfare is highly complex and unpredictable. What appears to be a stable and predictable military balance can be suddenly overthrown by innovative doctrines ...or cunning strategies. This paper attempts to fill a perceived gap in strategic studies analysis with respect to US–China naval conflict scenarios. The author is concerned that most Western analyses on the subject tend to be simplistic and unduly optimistic. The approach in this paper follows a “Chinese style” in that it examines the Asia-Pacific strategic balance as a series of interacting military campaigns. The results of the analysis yield that the US retains a strong advantage in certain warfare domains, to be sure. Yet, the assumption that the US military has a decisive advantage in the relevant scenarios becomes dubious in light of the potentially devastating blow against US and allied bases that could be made by PLA conventional missile forces. Moreover, a Chinese advantage in the use of offensive mine warfare, when combined with China's ability to prevent US and allied aerial anti-submarine forces from flying, could combine to roll back, or at least significantly limit, Washington's heretofore decisive undersea advantage. 在战略理论而言, 战争的进程是非常复杂和不可预测的。一个似乎稳定和可预测的军事平衡能突然被创新军事教义或灵巧的策略推翻。本文试图填补中美海上军事冲突的战略研究。作者认为, 大多数西方分析人对这个问题的判断往往是简单或过于乐观的。本文采用“中国式”方式将亚太战略平衡作为一系列相互影响的军事行动。 分析结果表明, 美国在某些战争领域仍然保留强大的优势。然而,鉴于中国常规导弹可能造成对美国与盟国的潜在破坏性打击,美军在有关情况下具有所谓决定性优势的假设存有相当多的疑点。 此外,解放军在使用进攻性水雷战争方面的优势,与中国在防止美国和盟军在空中反潜部队飞行的能力,也有望被结合起来对抗美国军事实力,或至少大大削减美军水下作战的决定性优势。 在这种情况下,中美海军对抗的最终结果似乎还是一个未知数。
This book addresses three important facets of China's modern development. First is the ongoing modernization of the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). The Chinese navy has grown from a relatively ...small, backward force in the 1980s into a capable twenty-first century maritime power. The PLAN now deploys around the world and includes nuclear-powered submarines, the first of several aircraft carriers, modern guided missile destroyers and frigates, and the world's most formidable force of seagoing cruise and ballistic missiles. This modern, growing navy is intended in significant part to undergird China's global search for energy sources and security. Beijing's determination to maintain its historic economic growth depends on energy security. These two national prioritiesa navy capable of defending China's national security and economic interests and secury energy resourcescome together to define and support Chinese foreign policy. This book addresses these three in both global and Asian contextual terms, with special emphasis on relations between China and the United States.
In January 2009, two destroyers and a supply ship from the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) began counterpiracy operations off the coast of Somalia. The mission of this modest task force was to ...offer protection to Chinese merchant vessels passing through the pirate-infested waters of the Gulf of Aden, but the unprecedented deployment also had the strategic effects of burnishing the international image of the People's Republic of China (PRC) as a contributor to international security and giving the PLAN a platform to hone its expeditionary capacity, especially in Africa, where the country has considerable political and economic interests. Since then, the Chinese have rotated more than a dozen task forces off the coast as part of ongoing patrols. The broader strategic nature of the Somali operation was underscored when a vessel taking part in the antipiracy operations was subsequently sent through the Suez Canal during the Libyan crisis of early 2011 in what was the PRC's first-ever operational deployment in the Mediterranean. This article seeks to examine the calculus behind Beijing's decision to send its warships on an antipiracy mission off Africa's eastern littoral, the political and strategic relevance of the deployment, the Chinese Navy's actual tactical and operational conduct, and the resulting implications for both African countries and outside powers, including the United States. It also examines the PLAN's new capabilities in relation to those that the land army (PLA) has developed through its decade-long experience with United Nations peacekeeping operations in Africa.
This article analyses the strategic dynamics of the Sino-Japanese relationship and argues that the potential for confrontation between China and Japan has been exaggerated. There is an underlying ...tendency in much of the literature to treat the emergence of rivalry between China and Japan since the end of the cold war as synonymous with an inevitable drift towards bilateral strategic confrontation. This article argues that Beijing and Tokyo are better placed to manage the strategic dimension of their bilateral relationship than many analysts have been willing to acknowledge thus far. To test this argument, the article examines two prominent case studies that lie at the heart of the contemporary and future Sino-Japanese bilateral strategic relationship: the territorial dispute over the East China Sea and Japan's virtual nuclear weapons capability.
China is rapidly emerging as a maritime power, with global commercial and regional military influence. Historically preoccupied with securing its land borders, China is now becoming increasingly ...reliant on the sea to import energy and raw materials as well as transport finished goods to market. Maritime security, therefore, is becoming a more serious strategic concern for Beijing. China's maritime industry contributed roughly 10 percent of national economic output in 2006 and its share of the national economy will likely rise sharply in coming years. As Chinese maritime interests continue to globalize, questions arise concerning the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)‘s ability to secure key sea lines of communication (SLOC) in a time of crisis. This disparity arises in part because China's PLAN is currently structured primarily to address sovereignty claims on China's maritime periphery, particularly concerning the status of Taiwan. It is unclear whether China will continue to rely on the U.S. Navy to maintain international SLOC security. Reshaping the PLAN into a “blue water” force capable of protecting sea lanes far from China would be an expensive and strategically provocative venture. This analysis examines the role that China's rapid commercial maritime development could play in driving such a transformation and offers barometers that might indicate if China were to pursue such a course.
China is an emerging maritime actor with expanding interests in security at sea. As a consequence, the capabilities of Chinese maritime security forces are improving, missions for the People's ...Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) are expanding, new actors and bureaucratic interests are emerging, and some observers feel that China is now more willing to challenge the interests of others in the maritime domain. CNA has undertaken this study to provide strategic-level context to foster discussion and debate about China's maritime rise and its implications. Key findings are as follows: China is in the midst of an important and potentially far-reaching reassessment of how the maritime domain fits into its national security calculus; Most of China's critical maritime security concerns and the focus of its efforts in terms of traditional security will continue to be close to home; China's maritime economic focus will likely be on ensuring access to, and control of, marine resources, guaranteeing freedom of movement of Chinese seaborne trade, and protecting its growing overseas economic interests; In ensuring and expanding access to the maritime domain, there is a domestic political stake for the ruling regime; Maritime policy-making and implementation is becoming more complex and diffuse due to the rise of new bureaucratic actors -- the PLA Navy is just one of those actors; China remains focused on building an offshore Navy that can defend China's territorial and economic interests in the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and South China Sea, and just beyond the First Island Chain; At the same time, China is actively discussing the need to develop a distant seas Navy -- not in an effort to sustain global operations, but rather to project a global presence and secure its interests.
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