Wie entstehen Musikdokumentationen? Und woran orientieren sich die Produzierenden - an der außerfilmischen Wirklichkeit oder an institutionellen Vorgaben, Quoten und Absatzmärkten? Christian Bettges ...beantwortet diese Fragen in Auseinandersetzung mit Jürgen Habermas' »Theorie des Kommunikativen Handelns« und arbeitet so multidimensionale Begründungsprozesse heraus. Er begreift Musikdokumentationen als Teil gesamtgesellschaftlicher Realitäten und formuliert eine radikale Absage an »Abbild-Theorien«. Im Rahmen künstlerischer Forschung rücken rationale Praxen des Kompilierens und Arrangierens von Materialien in den Timelines digitaler Schnittsysteme ins Zentrum der Analyse.
Immanuel Kant’s ‘Transcendental Deduction of the Categories’ addresses issues centrally debated today in philosophy and in cognitive sciences, especially in epistemology, and in theory of perception. ...Kant’s insights into these issues are clouded by pervasive misunderstandings of Kant’s ‘Deduction’ and its actual aims, scope, and argument. The present edition with its fresh and accurate translation and concise commentary aims to serve these contemporary debates as well as continuing intensive and extensive scholarship on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. Two surprising results are that ‘Transcendental Deduction’ is valid and sound, and it holds independently of Kant’s transcendental idealism. This lucid volume is interesting and useful to students, yet sufficiently detailed to be informative to specialists.
Antitrust analysis is famously complex, fact intensive, and time consuming. But should we aspire for it to be otherwise? I offer two cautionary conjectures in opposition to the search for simpler ...rules. First, I conjecture that efforts to convert vague antitrust standards into clear rules will rarely succeed without abandoning the underlying standards that the rules were meant to simplify. Second, I conjecture that failed efforts at simplifying antitrust will often have the opposite effect-increasing the apparent complexity and vagueness of this law. If these conjectures are correct, then the search for simpler rules could be not just unproductive but counterproductive in antitrust law.
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This paper aims to defend deliberation-compatibilism against several objections, including a recent counterexample by Yishai Cohen that involves a deliberator who believes that whichever ...action she performs will be the result of deterministic manipulation. It begins by offering a Moorean-style proof of deliberation-compatibilism. It then turns to the leading argument for deliberation-incompatibilism, which is based on the presumed incompatibility of causal determinism and the ‘openness’ required for rational deliberation. The paper explains why this argument fails and develops a coherent account of how one can rationally deliberate and believe in causal determinism without inconsistency. The second half of the paper then takes up Cohen's proposed counterexample and his Four-Case Deliberation Argument (FCDA) against deliberation-compatibilism, which is meant to mirror Derk Pereboom's famous Four-Case Manipulation Argument. In response, the author defends a hard-line reply to FCDA but also argues that the notion of ‘sourcehood’ relevant to rational deliberation differs from that involved in free will.
This article addresses Steven Nadler’s response to my objections to his reading of Spinoza’s free person (homo liber). Nadler argues that there are no clear and significant differences between the ...free person and the wise person (vir sapiens) in their character or in the role they play in Spinoza’s moral philosophy; in fact, they are one and the same. I begin by critically examining three inferences which Nadler’s reading in part relies on. I then address the differences between the contexts in which Spinoza explicitly invokes the free person and the wise person. I argue that even though there may not be significant differences between the free person and the wise person in terms of their character and comportment, there is still reason to think that the free person plays a particular role in Spinoza’s moral philosophy—one which does not hinge on the attainment of the cognitive and affective excellence represented by the wise person at the end of the Ethics.
This paper is a response to Sanem Soyarslan’s objections to my reading of Spinoza’s free person (homo liber). She argues that on my interpretation the free person, unlike the wise person (vir ...sapiens), while subject to passive affects, does not experience bondage to the passions; and so only the latter, but not the former, can serve as a viable “model of human nature.” I argue that, in fact, the free person and the wise person are, for Spinoza, one and the same indiviual, and thus constitute a single ideal model that we can more or less closely approximate.
Human reasoning has been characterized as an interplay between an automatic belief-based system and a demanding logic-based reasoning system. The present study tested a fundamental claim about the ...nature of individual differences in reasoning and the processing demands of both systems. Participants varying in working memory capacity performed a reasoning task while their executive resources were burdened with a secondary task. Results were consistent with the dual-process claim: The executive burden hampered correct reasoning when the believability of a conclusion conflicted with its logical validity, but not when beliefs cued the correct response. However, although participants with high working memory spans performed better than those with lower spans in cases of a conflict, all reasoners showed similar effects of load. The findings support the idea that there are two reasoning systems with differential processing demands, but constitute evidence against qualitative individual differences in the human reasoning machinery.
Given the success of the formal approach, within contemporary epistemology, to understanding degreed belief, some philosophers have recently considered its extension to the challenge of understanding ...intention. According to them, (1) intentions can also admit of degrees, as beliefs do, and (2) these degreed states are all governed by the norms of the probability calculus, such that the rational norms for belief and for intention exhibit certain structural similarity. This paper, however, raises some worries about (2). It considers two schemes for representing degreed intention, and casts some doubt on applying probabilistic norms to degreed intention on each scheme. And it argues that the norms of Intention-Belief Consistency and Enkrasia cannot plausibly be turned into norms prescribing a simple correspondence relation between one's degrees of belief and intention. The results suggest a potential structural discrepancy between the norms of theoretical and practical rationality-at least for degreed belief and intention. This potential discrepancy not only raises interesting questions about the intention-belief relation and rational norms for degreed intention. It also poses a new challenge for intention-based expressivism about normative judgment and cognitivism about practical rationality.
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