From Austria to New Zealand, coalition governments often pave the road to foreign policy. In Western Europe, nearly 90 percent of postwar governments include two or more political parties. Israel, ...the Middle East’s only consolidated democracy according to many, has never experienced single-party rule in its history. Even the United Kingdom, known for its long streak of single-party rule, now navigates multiparty cabinets. Coalitions are everywhere, but we still have little understanding of how they act in foreign affairs. History shows that coalitions can sometime engage in powerful international commitments such as participating in military operations, but at other times, they postpone their decisions, water down their policy positions, or promise to do less than they otherwise would. What explains these differences in behavior? Governing Abroad unpacks the little-known world of coalition governments to find out. Oktay argues that the specific constellation of parties in government explains why some coalitions can make more assertive foreign policy decisions than others. Building on the rich literature in political science on coalitions, legislatures, and voting behavior, the book weaves together sophisticated statistical analyses of foreign policy events across thirty European countries alongside in-depth case studies from Denmark, the Netherlands, and Finland. It brings political parties back into the study of foreign policy, demonstrating that the size of the coalition, the ideological proximity of the governing parties, and their relationship with the parliamentary opposition together influence the government’s ability to act in the international arena. This book challenges our existing perceptions about the constraints and weaknesses of coalition governments. It sheds new light on the conditions that allow them to act decisively abroad.
Editors’ Notes Ann Webb Price; Brown, Kyrah K; Wolfe, Susan M
New directions for evaluation,
04/2020, Letnik:
2020, Številka:
165
Journal Article
Coalitions are sometimes referred to as collaboratives, community networks, collective impact initiatives, affiliates, partnerships, or by other terms. While these terms are sometimes used ...interchangeably, the editors in this issue used the Community Tool Box's (CTB) (Community Toolbox, n.d.) definition of a coalition: "a group of individuals and organizations with a common interest who agree to work together toward a common goal." To a large extent, all of the groups cited above meet the CTB's definition of a coalition, regardless of their names.
Why are politicians able to form electoral coalitions that bridge ethnic divisions in some countries and not others? This book answers this question by presenting a theory of pecuniary coalition ...building in multi-ethnic countries governed through patronage. Focusing on sub-Saharan Africa, the book explains how the relative autonomy of business from state-controlled capital affects political bargaining among opposition politicians in particular. While incumbents form coalitions by using state resources to secure cross-ethnic endorsements, opposition politicians must rely on the private resources of business to do the same. This book combines cross-national analyses of African countries with in-depth case studies of Cameroon and Kenya to show that incumbents actively manipulate financial controls to prevent business from supporting their opposition. It demonstrates that opposition politicians are more likely to coalesce across ethnic cleavages once incumbents have lost their ability to blackmail the business sector through financial reprisals. Summary reprinted by permission of Cambridge University Press
The Pakatan Harapan (PH) coalition won Malaysia's 14th general election on 9 May 2018, the first time a regime change took place in the country. However, it lost its majority in late February 2020, ...when Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia (BERSATU) left the coalition.The four parties in PH had very different ideologies, especially when it comes to issues of race and religion. But despite taking various steps to create a coalition agreement, the more fundamental differences were never reconciled during the coalition's time in power.PH won GE-14 with a relatively low level of support from the ethnic Malays, who perceived it to be a coalition dominated by the mainly Chinese DAP. Fearmongering about how PH and the DAP were a threat to Malay privileges further weakened PH while in government.Furthermore, BERSATU disliked the possibility that Parti Keadilan Rakyat (KEADILAN) president Anwar Ibrahim might succeed Mahathir Mohamad as prime minister. They did not trust Anwar to champion the Malay agenda if he became prime minister.BERSATU decided as early as in 2019 to explore leaving PH to form a new Malay-led government, and saw the departure as a necessary step for a better chance at winning GE15.This was a controversial decision and it created a major rift within BERSATU itself, with party chairman and then Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad refusing to accept the party's decision to leave PH.Following Mahathir's sudden resignation on 24 February 2020, BERSATU immediately announced their departure from PH. This led to a series of events that culminated in the collapse of PH and the formation a Perikatan Nasional government led by the three biggest Malay parties, UMNO, BERSATU and PAS.The whole episode shows that any coalition or political parties that wish to govern Malaysia must not ignore sentiments among the Malays, especially those in rural areas.
This article investigates the recent government participation of a number of radical right-wing populist parties in West European democracies. With the help of coalition formation theories the ...government coalitions in which these parties have participated are characterised and inferences are made about the reasons for the cooperation between mainstream right and radical right-wing populist parties. The accuracy of these inferences is then examined in more detail by analysing the changing electoral fortunes and party positions of both mainstream and radical right-wing populist parties. These analyses demonstrate that office, policy and votes made mainstream right parties turn to radical right-wing populist parties as new coalition partners and that two important changes in West European party systems have enabled the formation of the new alliances, the first being an electoral shift to the right and the second the convergence of party positions of mainstream right and radical right-wing populist parties.
The Poor People's Campaign of 1968 has long been overshadowed by the assassination of its architect, Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., and the political turmoil of that year. In a major reinterpretation of ...civil rights and Chicano movement history, Gordon K. Mantler demonstrates how King's unfinished crusade became the era's most high-profile attempt at multiracial collaboration and sheds light on the interdependent relationship between racial identity and political coalition among African Americans and Mexican Americans. Mantler argues that while the fight against poverty held great potential for black-brown cooperation, such efforts also exposed the complex dynamics between the nation's two largest minority groups.Drawing on oral histories, archives, periodicals, and FBI surveillance files, Mantler paints a rich portrait of the campaign and the larger antipoverty work from which it emerged, including the labor activism of Cesar Chavez, opposition of Black and Chicano Power to state violence in Chicago and Denver, and advocacy for Mexican American land-grant rights in New Mexico. Ultimately, Mantler challenges readers to rethink the multiracial history of the long civil rights movement and the difficulty of sustaining political coalitions.
Diverse coalitions hold great potential for social movements, but they also face tremendous challenges. In this article, I review the literature on diverse alliances with a focus on how trust, ...commitment, and ultimately, solidarity can be developed and sustained across divides. The article begins by discussing the needs of diverse alliances to build trust and commitment, and the coalitional characteristics deemed vital for doing so, with a focus on shared neutral space, ongoing interaction, and social ties and bridgebuilders. Five coalitional processes and practices are identified and discussed that have been empirically found or theorized to be imperative for cultivating solidarity across difference and inequality. These processes include (a) uniting around shared principles while engaging difference; (b) acknowledging and managing inequalities; (c) making space for each other; (d) attention to managing conflicts; and (e) actions that confirm the shared commitments and negotiated identity. I conclude by evaluating the state of research on developing and sustaining alliances across divides.
The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) is a prominent approach to investigate the formation of coalition and their impact on policy outputs. Although the ACF combines both the network structures of a ...political process with actors' values and belief systems, most empirical tests focus mainly on beliefs rather than network structures. Considering a relational approach makes particular sense when one wants to investigate the structural patterns of a subsystem and to assess coalition formation and maintenance. The author therefore proceeds by taking two steps to study the existence of coalitions, power relations, and policy preferences: first, social network analysis frames the empirical study of network structures, based on the assumption that common beliefs are reflected in relations among actors involved in policy processes. Second, using a sophisticated mathematical algorithm, the multicriteria analysis furnishes a systematic evaluation of the elite's belief system. This methodological combination constitutes the added value of this research and allows for testing to establish if common beliefs are reflected in network structures.
Ministerial portfolios are the most obvious payoffs for parties entering a governing coalition in parliamentary democracies. This renders the bargaining over portfolios an important phase of the ...government formation process. The question of ‘who gets what, and why?’ in terms of ministerial remits has not yet received much attention by coalition or party scholars. This article focuses on this qualitative aspect of portfolio allocation and uses a new comparative dataset to evaluate a number of hypotheses that can be drawn from the literature. The main hypothesis is that parties which, in their election manifestos, emphasise themes corresponding to the policy remit of specific cabinet portfolios are more likely to obtain control over these portfolios. The results show that policy saliency is indeed an important predictor of portfolio allocation in postwar Western European parliamentary democracies.
THE FARSIGHTED STABLE SET Ray, Debraj; Vohra, Rajiv
Econometrica,
20/May , Letnik:
83, Številka:
3
Journal Article
Recenzirano
Odprti dostop
Harsanyi (1974) criticized the von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) stable set for its presumption that coalitions are myopic about their prospects. He proposed a new dominance relation incorporating ...farsightedness, but retained another feature of the stable set: that a coalition S can impose any imputation as long as its restriction to S is feasible for it. This implicitly gives an objecting coalition complete power to arrange the payoffs of players elsewhere, which is clearly unsatisfactory. While this assumption is largely innocuous for myopic dominance, it is of crucial significance for its farsighted counterpart. Our modification of the Harsanyi set respects "coalitional sovereignty." The resulting farsighted stable set is very different from both the Harsanyi and the vNM sets. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a farsighted stable set containing just a single-payoff allocation. This condition roughly establishes an equivalence between core allocations and the union of allocations over all single-payoff farsighted stable sets. We then conduct a comprehensive analysis of the existence and structure of farsighted stable sets in simple games. This last exercise throws light on both single-payoff and multi-payoff stable sets, and suggests that they do not coexist.