Objective
To assess the characteristics and financial conflicts of interest of presenters, panellists and moderators at haematology and oncology workshops held jointly with or hosted by the US FDA.
...Setting
We included information on all publicly available haematology or oncology FDA workshop agendas held between 1 January 2018 and 31 December 2022.
Exposure
General and research payments reported on Open Payments, industry funding to patient advocacy organizations reported on their webpages or 990 tax forms and employment in both pharmaceutical and regulatory settings.
Results
Among physicians eligible for payments, 78% received at least one payment from the industry between 2017 and 2021. The mean general payment amount was $82,170 for all years ($16,434 per year) and the median was $14,906 for all years ($2981 per year). Sixty‐nine per cent of patient advocacy speakers were representing organizations that received financial support from the pharmaceutical industry. Among those representing regulatory agencies or pharmaceutical companies, 16% had worked in both settings during their careers.
Conclusions and Relevance
Our findings in this cross‐sectional study show a majority of US‐based physician presenters at haematology and oncology workshops held jointly with members of the US FDA have some financial conflict of interest with the pharmaceutical industry. These findings support the need for clear disclosures and suggest that a more balanced selection of presenters with fewer conflicts may help to limit bias in discussions between multiple stakeholders.
We examined the characteristics and conflicts of interest of presenters at haematology/oncology workshops held with the US FDA. Among US physician presenters, the mean general yearly payment from the pharmaceutical industry was $16,434 (median $2981). We found that 69% of patient advocacy speakers were representing organizations funded by the pharmaceutical industry. Among those for which detailed meeting slides or recordings could be obtained, we found that 50% of presenters included a disclosure slide or verbally indicated their disclosures.
Updated Conflict of Interest Disclosures Snyderman, Ralph
JAMA : the journal of the American Medical Association,
02/2023, Letnik:
329, Številka:
8
Journal Article
A handful of digital platforms mediate a growing share of online commerce and communications. By structuring access to markets, these firms function as gatekeepers for billions of dollars in economic ...activity. One feature dominant digital platforms share is that they have integrated across business lines such that they both operate a platform and market their own goods and services on it. This structure places dominant platforms in direct competition with some of the businesses that depend on them, creating a conflict of interest that platforms can exploit to further entrench their dominance, thwart competition, and stifle innovation.
This Article argues that the potential hazards of integration by dominant tech platforms invite recovering structural separations. Separations regimes limit the lines of business in which a firm can engage, either by proscribing entry in certain markets or by requiring that distinct lines of business be operated through separate affiliates. Previously implemented both as a standard regulatory intervention and key antitrust remedy in network industries, structural separations have been largely abandoned. At the same time that lawmakers have weakened or eliminated sector-specific regulatory regimes, judicial interpretation of antitrust law has drastically narrowed the forms of vertical conduct and structures that register as anticompetitive. And when antitrust enforcers have targeted these forms of conduct and structures, they have applied remedies that generally (1) fail to target the underlying source of the problem and (2) overwhelm the institutional capacities of the actors assigned to oversee them. Neglecting structural remedies results in both substantive harms and institutional misalignments—effects that are especially pronounced in digital platform markets.
This Article seeks to give structural separations a seat back at the table. Tracing the history of separations reveals that they have been motivated by a host of functional goals, ranging from fair competition and system resiliency to media diversity and administrability. Recalling this broader set of concerns brings into focus the range of factors at stake when dealing with dominant intermediaries and invites consideration of the degree to which separations in platform markets would also respond to a diverse set of problems.
PDF
