This book presents a comprehensive overview of what the criminal law would look like if organised around the principle that those who deserve punishment should receive punishment commensurate with, ...but no greater than, that which they deserve. Larry Alexander and Kimberly Kessler Ferzan argue that desert is a function of the actor's culpability, and that culpability is a function of the risks of harm to protected interests that the actor believes he is imposing and his reasons for acting in the face of those risks. The authors deny that resultant harms, as well as unperceived risks, affect the actor's desert. They thus reject punishment for inadvertent negligence as well as for intentions or preparatory acts that are not risky. Alexander and Ferzan discuss the reasons for imposing risks that negate or mitigate culpability, the individuation of crimes, and omissions.
This book is about the role causation plays in the attribution of both moral responsibility and legal liability (in the law of crimes, torts, and to a lesser extent, contracts). The book strips away ...many of the usages of the word ‘causation’ in law and legal theory, on the grounds that such usages have little to do with causation itself. What remains is the law's use of ‘causation’ to name a natural relation that is at the heart of both ordinary and scientific explanations of the world. Some normative defense is offered as to why causation in this sense is a proper basis for assessing degrees of both culpability and permissibility in morality and also in law. A more extended metaphysical defense is also offered, as to the nature of the causal relation and as to the nature of the things related by the causal relation. This normative and metaphysical analysis is used as the springboard from which to critique much of what the law currently says about causation, including the law's counterfactual test for cause in fact, its notions of intervening cause, foreseeability, harm within the risk, accomplice liability, the causal status of omissions and of non-omissive allowings, and more besides. The result is a rethinking of causation's nature and role in our legal and moral practices of assigning blame and responsibility.
This is a magisterial account of the day-to-day practice of Russian criminal justice in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Nancy Kollmann contrasts Russian written law with its pragmatic ...application by local judges, arguing that this combination of formal law and legal institutions with informal, flexible practice contributed to the country's social and political stability. She also places Russian developments in the broader context of early modern European state-building strategies of governance and legal practice. She compares Russia's rituals of execution to the 'spectacles of suffering' of contemporary European capital punishment and uncovers the dramatic ways in which even the tsar himself, complying with Moscow's ideologies of legitimacy, bent to the moral economy of the crowd in moments of uprising. Throughout, the book assesses how criminal legal practice used violence strategically, administering horrific punishments in some cases and in others accommodating with local communities and popular concepts of justice.
This book provides a refined definition of co-perpetration responsibility that could be uniformly applied in both the ad hoc- and the treaty-based (ICC Rome Statue) model of international criminal ...justice.
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