Experiments on theories of reference have mostly tested referential intuitions. We think that experiments should rather be testing linguistic usage. Substantive Aim (I): to test classical description ...theories of proper names against usage by “elicited production.” Our results count decisively against those theories. Methodological Aim (I): Machery, Olivola, and de Blanc () claim that truth‐value judgment experiments test usage. Martí () disagrees. We argue that Machery et al. are right and offer some results that are consistent with that conclusion. Substantive Aim (II): Machery et al. provide evidence that the usage of a name varies, being sometimes descriptive, sometimes not. In seven out of eight tests of usage, we did not replicate this variation. Methodological Aim (II): to test the reliability of referential intuitions by comparing them with linguistic usage. Earlier studies led us to predict that we would find those intuitions unreliable, but we did not. Our results add to evidence that tests of referential intuition are susceptible to unpredictable wording effects.
Is moral judgment accomplished by intuition or conscious reasoning? An answer demands a detailed account of the moral principles in question. We investigated three principles that guide moral ...judgments: (a) Harm caused by action is worse than harm caused by omission, (b) harm intended as the means to a goal is worse than harm foreseen as the side effect of a goal, and (c) harm involving physical contact with the victim is worse than harm involving no physical contact. Asking whether these principles are invoked to explain moral judgments, we found that subjects generally appealed to the first and third principles in their justifications, but not to the second. This finding has significance for methods and theories of moral psychology: The moral principles used in judgment must be directly compared with those articulated in justification, and doing so shows that some moral principles are available to conscious reasoning whereas others are not.
•Participants ascribed slightly higher but similar levels of freedom, free will, and control for arbitrary compared to easy deliberate decisions.•Participants ascribed greater freedom, free will, and ...control for easy decisions compared to difficult deliberate decisions.•Participants ascribed high levels of freedom, free will, and control while denying the ability to do otherwise in easy deliberate decisions.•Whether decisions were highly consequential or mundane had little impact on participants’ intuitions about freedom, free will, control, and the ability to do otherwise.
Philosophical accounts of free will frequently appeal to deliberate, consequential, and purposeful decisions. However, some recent studies have found that laypeople attribute more freedom to arbitrary than to deliberate decisions. We hypothesized that these differences stem from diverging intuitions about concepts surrounding free will—especially freedom, being in control, and the ability to decide otherwise. In two studies, we found that laypeople attributed high levels of free will, freedom, and control to both arbitrary and deliberate decisions. However, subjects surprisingly attributed reduced ability to decide otherwise when faced with an “easy” decision with one clearly superior option. Furthermore, laypeople attributed greater free will, freedom, and control to “easy” than “hard” decisions with no clearly superior option. Our results suggest that laypeople have diverging intuitions about these different, free-will-related concepts. Therefore, a scientific account of free will may require integrating results from studies on different types of decision-making.
Worldwide, obesity is a growing concern. The implicit belief that healthiness and tastiness in food are inversely related (the Unhealthy = Tasty Intuition or UTI) decreases healthy food consumption ...and increases the risk of obesity. Since also childhood obesity has increased at an alarming rate and a large component of adult obesity is established during childhood, questions about children's own food beliefs and preferences are important. However, methods currently used to assess the UTI are either unvalidated Likert scales or implicit measures that are time intensive and too complex to be used for children. Two studies presented here offer an alternative measurement - the simple visual analogue scale. The findings show that this measure is more effective in predicting dietary quality in adults and the frequency of healthy food consumption in children compared to more traditional measures. This simple and effective tool could be used by academics and health practitioners alike to better understand children's food beliefs at an early age, which is a critical step when addressing the increasing obesity problem.
An ongoing debate in the literature on human reasoning concerns whether or not the logical status (valid vs. invalid) of an argument can be intuitively detected. The finding that conclusions of ...logically valid inferences are liked more compared to conclusions of logically invalid ones-called the logic-liking effect-is one of the most prominent pieces of evidence in support of this notion. Trippas et al. (2016) found this logic-liking effect for different kinds of inferences, including conditional and categorical syllogisms. However, all invalid conclusions presented by Trippas et al. (2016) were also impossible given the premises and had a particular structure of surface features-that is, an incongruent atmosphere. We present new data from five preregistered experiments in which we replicate the effect reported by Trippas et al. (2016) for conditional and categorical syllogisms but show that this effect is eliminated when controlling for confounds in surface features. Moreover, we present evidence that there is a demand effect at play, which suggests that people are deliberately considering atmosphere cues of an argument to inform their liking ratings. Taken together, the findings of the present study cast doubt on the existence of logical intuitions.
Do people intuitively favour certain actions over others? In some dual-process research, reaction-time (RT) data have been used to infer that certain choices are intuitive. However, the use of ...behavioural or biological measures to infer mental function, popularly known as 'reverse inference', is problematic because it does not take into account other sources of variability in the data, such as discriminability of the choice options. Here we use two example data sets obtained from value-based choice experiments to demonstrate that, after controlling for discriminability (that is, strength-of-preference), there is no evidence that one type of choice is systematically faster than the other. Moreover, using specific variations of a prominent value-based choice experiment, we are able to predictably replicate, eliminate or reverse previously reported correlations between RT and selfishness. Thus, our findings shed crucial light on the use of RT in inferring mental processes and strongly caution against using RT differences as evidence favouring dual-process accounts.
This paper applies the Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator (LASSO) to make rolling one-minute-ahead return forecasts using the entire cross-section of lagged returns as candidate ...predictors. The LASSO increases both out-of-sample fit and forecast-implied Sharpe ratios. This out-of-sample success comes from identifying predictors that are unexpected, short-lived, and sparse. Although the LASSO uses a statistical rule rather than economic intuition to identiy predictors, the predictors it identifies are nevertheless associated with economically meaningful events: the LASSO tends to identify as predictors stocks with news about fundamentals.
Moral Intuition Weaver, Gary R.; Reynolds, Scott J.; Brown, Michael E.
Journal of management,
01/2014, Letnik:
40, Številka:
1
Journal Article
Recenzirano
In contrast to older, conventional accounts that treat ethical decision making and behavior as the result of deliberative and intendedly rational processes, a rapidly growing body of social science ...research has framed ethical thought and behavior as driven by intuition. We review this important new body of knowledge in terms of both the process and content of moral intuition. Then, to demonstrate its value to organizational scholars, we consider the potential impact of moral intuition research in four areas of organizational studies especially suited to insights from this research: leadership, organizational corruption, ethics training and education, and divestiture socialization. Our review and discussion suggest that the literature on moral intuition is incredibly rich, fruitful, and meaningful to a wide range of audiences.
Abductive theorizing goes beyond mere idea generation and requires disciplined imagination and a prepared mind. Here, Sartre and Van de Ven explore the concept of abductive theorizing and its ...importance in the field of management. They argue that abductive theorizing involves more than just generating ideas; it requires a systematic approach that combines imagination, intuition, and logical reasoning. They emphasize the need for researchers to cultivate a prepared mind, which involves developing a deep understanding of the subject matter and being open to unexpected insights. They highlight the value of abductive theorizing in generating new knowledge and advancing the field of management.
Affirmative action has long been a contentious issue in the United States. Using data from a 2021 national YouGov sample of 1125 U.S. adults, we are the first to examine the effect of moral ...intuitions on people's support for affirmative action in college admissions. We find that those with strong individualizing moral intuitions—a heightened general concern with avoiding harm and mistreatment of people—are more likely to support affirmative action. We find that its effect is mediated in large part by beliefs in the extent of systemic racism, as those with strong individualizing moral intuitions are more likely to also believe that systemic racism is pervasive, and also partly by low levels of racial resentment. Conversely, those with strong binding moral intuitions—a heightened concern with the cohesion of social groups—are less likely to support affirmative action. This effect is also mediated by belief in the extent of systemic racism and racial resentment, as those with strong binding moral intuitions are more likely to believe both that the system is fair and have higher levels of racial resentment. Our study suggests that future work should consider the role of moral intuitions in shaping people's views of contentious social policies.
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