Contemporary research in compositional, truth-conditional semantics often takes judgments of the relative unacceptability of certain phrasal combinations as evidence for lexical semantics. For ...example, observing that
sounds perfectly natural whereas
does not has been used to motivate a distinction whereby the lexical entry for
but not for
specifies a scalar endpoint. So far, such inferences seem unobjectionable. In general, however, applying this methodology can lead to dubious conclusions. For example, observing that
is natural but
is not (that is, not without a "too cheap" interpretation) leads researchers to suggest that the interpretation of
involves a scalar minimum but
does not, contra intuition-after all, one would think that what is minimally cheap is (just) free. Such claims, found in sufficient abundance, raise the question of how we can support semantic theories that posit properties of entities that those entities appear to lack. This paper argues, using theories of adjectival scale structure as a test case, that the (un)acceptability data recruited in semantic explanations reveals properties of a two-stage system of semantic interpretation that can support divergences between our semantic and metaphysical intuitions.
In this paper we will propose a simple linguistic approach to the Knobe effect, or the moral asymmetry of intention attribution in general, which is just to ask the felicity judgments on the relevant ...sentences without any vignette at all. Through this approach we were in fact able to reproduce the (quasi-) Knobe effects in different languages (English and Japanese), with large effect sizes. We shall defend the significance of this simple approach by arguing that our approach and its results not only tell interesting facts about the concept of intentional action, but also show the existence of the linguistic default, which requires independent investigation. We will then argue that, despite the recent view on experimental philosophy by Knobe himself, there is a legitimate role of the empirical study of concepts in the investigations of cognitive processes in mainstream experimental philosophy, which suggests a broadly supplementary picture of experimental philosophy.
There is arguably a parallel between recent ideas within cognitive science about the distributed mind and the development within linguistics known as integrationism, turning on similarities between ...the critique offered by the former of the ‘classical’ view of mind and by the latter of the ‘classical’ view of language. However, at the heart of the integrationist attack on the classical view of language is rejection of the idea that natural languages are codes. This idea appears to be taken for granted by certain cognitive scientists as the basis for explaining not only how language is mentally apprehended by the individual, but also how it facilitates ‘second-order cognition’. It is suggested that the language-as-code idea, although
prima facie endowed with the attractiveness of common sense, is untenable, and should not figure, at least in the role usually assigned to it, in any inquiry into either language or human cognition in general.
Ukazujući na kreativnost kao ključno obilježje prirodnog jezika, Chomsky je neizravno obogatio svoju teoriju filozofskom dimenzijom u kojoj je vidljiv utjecaj nauka novovjekovnog racionalizma ...poznatog kao kartezijanizam (Cartesius, latinizirano Descartesovo ime), zbog čega je spomenuti mentalistički pravac znakovito nazvao kartezijanskom lingvistikom (engl. Cartesian Linguistics, CL). To je ujedno naziv njegova dubokoumnog eseja iz 1966. godine, odnosno poglavlja o povijesti racionalističke misli, u kojem najprije predstavlja upravo kreativnost kao jezičnu pojavnost, potom usporedno analizira dubinsku i površinsku strukturu jezika, također problematizira opis i tumačenje u lingvistici te konačno pojašnjava vlastito stajalište o usvajanju prvog jezika iz kartezijanske perspektive. Autorica u radu kratko analizira kontekst nastanka navedenog eseja polazeći od osnovnih spoznaja o (ino)jezičnom razvoju što ih je Chomsky rano zagovarao i tako snažno utjecao na daljnje (ne)nativističko tumačenje tog vrlo slojevitog procesa.
Benjamin Lee Whorf’s (1897–1941) writings generally fall into two categories: those related to his research on the Hopi and Mayan cultures and languages, and those providing a critique of linguistic ...theory in particular and Western science in general. This paper is focused on six essays in Carroll’s collection of Whorf’s work: the first two essays, written in the mid-1930s, fall into the first category: “An American Indian Model of the Universe” and “A Linguistic Consideration of Thinking in Primitive Communities”; and the final four essays, written at the end of his life, fall into the second category: “Science and Linguistics” (1940), “Linguistics as an Exact Science” (1940), “Language and Logic” (1941), and “Language, Mind, and Reality” (1942).
This article addresses a question which has in recent years been widely discussed: that of the specific features of mental functions and language in humans as compared with other higher biological ...species. The main hypotheses of the origin and evolution of humans and their language are discussed, along with studies identifying genes responsible for higher functions. The cognitive capacities of animals and their communication signals are addressed, as are the basic principles of brain functions.
The current thesis is based on the research of the psychoanalytical concepts of agency, subject and structure while it correlates the same notions with the clinical observations of patients with ...personality disorder in crisis patient group. It also proposes an answer to the problem of agency and structure, incorporating structuration theory and recursivity. This is done by the construction and outline of a new framework, which is designated as the scaffolding model. The analysis of the analytical observations demonstrated that patients present in the clinical arena with dual narratives that include two accounts, which have been identified as the problem and the solution formed scenarios. This twofold situation is guided by a dyadic functioning process, which is a functional pattern that not only regulates language but it also maintains an integrated function in the brain and in the mind of the subject. It constitutes a new structure, which associates the brain-mind and language +senses, forming a “self-organization system”. Agency, here, is the power or vacuum that allows symbolic action. This research offers a new tool in the treatment of members of the patient group or in the treatment of subjects who present ambivalently or in conflict. This new approach designated as dual narratives facilitate a different perspective than the ones already established, such as cognitive analytical therapy, which give answers to the same clinical situations. Dual narratives work at two levels. This is done by preventing risks and by looking into the causes of the ambivalence of the subject, using Lacanian concepts, such as the notion of the signifier, and exploring the subjective position.
Reviewing the ‘language instinct’ debate, the paper identifies generativist views with the baby's proverbial bathwater. As Sampson suggests, empirical evidence can lend no support to the claim that ...grammatical analysis illuminates the study of development, evolution, or the brain. Language instinct theory is coherent only if we adopt Pinker's (dubious) hypothesis that syntax possesses ‘inner’ reality.
To argue that grammar is purely ‘cultural’ also proves unsatisfactory. In Sampson's terms, indeed, it leads to dualism and/or a belief in a ‘haunted universe’. Thus, it implausibly suggests that neither real-time events, development, nor evolution have grammatical consequencs. To avoid allowing the biological baby to disappear with the generativist bathwater, I propose we reject Pinker and Sampson's basic shared assumption. Instead of analyzing language into form-based units, we can treat it as an aspect of social life deriving from a capacity to contextualize experience. Rather than seek evidence supporting language instinct theory, we ask how the dualism of genotype and phenotype constrains an idividual's contextualizing activity.
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