Scale and skill in active management Pástor, Ľuboš; Stambaugh, Robert F.; Taylor, Lucian A.
Journal of financial economics,
04/2015, Letnik:
116, Številka:
1
Journal Article
Recenzirano
We empirically analyze the nature of returns to scale in active mutual fund management. We find strong evidence of decreasing returns at the industry level. As the size of the active mutual fund ...industry increases, a fund׳s ability to outperform passive benchmarks declines. At the fund level, all methods considered indicate decreasing returns, though estimates that avoid econometric biases are insignificant. We also find that the active management industry has become more skilled over time. This upward trend in skill coincides with industry growth, which precludes the skill improvement from boosting fund performance. Finally, we find that performance deteriorates over a typical fund׳s lifetime. This result can also be explained by industry-level decreasing returns to scale.
A mutual fund is a common instrument for households and corporations to invest in the financial markets through diversified portfolios of securities. Investing in managed mutual funds involves ...relying on a fund manager’s knowledge, expertise, and investment strategy to beat the fund’s benchmark. The purpose of this paper is to help mutual fund investors in their fund selection process. The fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) is the methodology applied to identify combinations of factors that facilitate the selection of performing mutual funds. The goal is to determine whether fund manager skill, as measured by Jensen’s Alpha and other qualitative factors, is a key driver of performance. Our research focuses on US-registered equity funds with a global investing scope over a 5-year period (2016–2021), and we combine three mutual fund databases to obtain more complete data while enhancing data accuracy and consistency. The findings reveal that both manager skill and fund size are pervasive factors included in all three successful combinations of sufficiency conditions leading to high-performance funds. In addition, it is verified that manager skill is the only necessary condition to ensure high returns on mutual funds. Investors’ fund selection process is a cumbersome task that can be simplified with the successful recipes provided by the fsQCA model.
Although the academic interest in ethical mutual fund performance has developed steadily, the evidence to date is mainly sample-specific. To tackle this critique, new research should extend to ...unexplored countries. Using this as a motivation, we examine the performance and risk sensitivities of Canadian ethical mutual funds vis-à-vis their conventional peers. In order to overcome the methodological deficiencies most prior papers suffered from, we use performance measurement approaches in the spirit of Carhart (1997, Journal of Finance 52(1): 57-82) and Ferson and Schadt (1996, Journal of Finance 51(2): 425-461). In doing so, we investigate the aggregated performance and investment style of ethical and conventional mutual funds and allow for time variation in the funds' systematic risk. Our Canadian evidence supports the conjecture that any performance differential between ethical mutual funds and their conventional peers is statistically insignificant.
We examine the effect of behavioral biases on the mutual fund choices of a large sample of US discount brokerage investors using new measures of attention to news, tax awareness, and fund-level ...familiarity bias, in addition to behavioral and demographic characteristics of earlier studies. Behaviorally biased investors typically make poor decisions about fund style and expenses, trading frequency, and timing, resulting in poor performance. Furthermore, trend chasing appears related to behavioral biases, rather than to rationally inferring managerial skill from past performance. Factor analysis suggests that biased investors often conform to stereotypes that can be characterized as Gambler, Smart, Overconfident, Narrow Framer, and Mature.
ABSTRACT
We find that mutual funds whose managers are socially connected with firm auditors hold more shares of these firms and generate superior portfolio returns. Cross‐sectional results reveal ...that the relation between social connections and mutual fund stockholdings is more pronounced: when the social connections are stronger, when the auditor is in a better position or has stronger incentives to acquire private information, when the fund manager exercises more power, for small audit firms, for auditors in areas with poor investor protection, and for public firms with greater business opacity or private information. Other results are consistent with fund managers electing to schedule their corporate site visits to coincide with the fieldwork of their connected auditors, as would be expected if fund managers time their visits to meet with these auditors to facilitate information transfer. Additionally, we observe associations between fund trading prior to earnings surprises and audit opinions, and the presence of social connections between fund managers and firm auditors. Finally, we show that mutual funds and firms in which they invest tend to appoint connected auditors and pay them higher fees. Collectively, we document empirical patterns that would arise if socially connected auditors and mutual fund managers share information.
Methods Using the New York State Percutaneous Coronary Intervention (PCI) reporting system, we obtained 2014 PCI outcomes data from all PCI-performing hospitals that also had CMS star ratings ...reported on the CMS Hospital Compare website. The number of PCI cases performed increased with star rating and ranged from 437.1 ± 307.4 cases for 1 star hospitals to 1166.7 ± 858.7 cases for 4 star hospitals.
We use daily Internet search volume from millions of households to reveal market-level sentiment. By aggregating the volume of queries related to household concerns (e.g., "recession," ..."unemployment," and "bankruptcy"), we construct a Financial and Economic Attitudes Revealed by Search (FEARS) index as a new measure of investor sentiment. Between 2004 and 2011, we find FEARS (i) predict short-term return reversals, (ii) predict temporary increases in volatility, and (iii) predict mutual fund flows out of equity funds and into bond funds. Taken together, the results are broadly consistent with theories of investor sentiment.
We investigate whether business ties with portfolio firms influence mutual funds' proxy voting using a comprehensive data set spanning 2003 to 2011. In contrast to prior literature, we find that ...business ties significantly influence promanagement voting at the level of individual pairs of fund families and firms after controlling for Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) recommendations and holdings. The association is significant only for shareholder-sponsored proposals and stronger for those that pass or fail by relatively narrow margins. Our findings are consistent with a demanddriven model of biased voting in which company managers use existing business ties with funds to influence how they vote.
Index funds own an increasingly large proportion of American public companies. The stewardship decisions of index fund managers—how they monitor, vote, and engage with their portfolio companies—can ...be expected to have a profound impact on the governance and performance of public companies and the economy. Understanding index fund stewardship, and how policymaking can improve it, is thus critical for corporate law scholarship. In this Article we contribute to such understanding by providing a comprehensive theoretical, empirical, and policy analysis of index fund stewardship.
We begin by putting forward an agency-costs theory of index fund incentives. Stewardship decisions by index funds depend not just on the interests of index fund investors but also on the incentives of index fund managers. Our agency-costs analysis shows that index fund managers have strong incentives to (i) underinvest in stewardship and (ii) defer excessively to the preferences and positions of corporate managers.
We then provide an empirical analysis of the full range of stewardship activities that index funds do and do not undertake, focusing on the three largest index fund managers, which we collectively refer to as the “Big Three.” We analyze four dimensions of the Big Three’s stewardship activities: the limited personnel time they devote to stewardship regarding most of their portfolio companies; the small minority of portfolio companies with which they have any private communications; their focus on divergences from governance principles and their limited attention to other issues that could be significant for their investors; and their pro-management voting patterns.
We also empirically investigate five ways in which the Big Three could fail to undertake adequate stewardship: the limited attention they pay to financial underperformance; their lack of involvement in the selection of directors and lack of attention to important director characteristics; their failure to take actions that would bring about governance changes that are desirable according to their own governance principles; their decision to stay on the sidelines regarding corporate governance reforms; and their avoidance of involvement in consequential securities litigation. We show that this body of evidence is, on the whole, consistent with the incentive problems that our agency-costs framework identifies.
Finally, we put forward a set of reforms that policymakers should consider in order to address the incentives of index fund managers to underinvest in stewardship, their incentives to be excessively deferential to corporate managers, and the continuing rise of index investing. We also discuss how our analysis should reorient important ongoing debates regarding common ownership and hedge fund activism.
The policy measures we put forward, and the beneficial role of hedge fund activism, can partly but not fully address the incentive problems that we analyze and document. These problems are expected to remain a significant aspect of the corporate governance landscape and should be the subject of close attention by policymakers, market participants, and scholars.
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