In recent years China has forged an increasing number of strategic partnerships with other countries while maintaining its 'non-alignment policy'. However, these partnerships are mainly bilateral ...rather than minilateral, and they thus have less potential to influence the Indo-Pacific regional order. This article examines how China has responded to the US-led security network, in which minilateralism features prominently, and argues that China has implemented a coercion strategy against India and Australia, who are two of the main regional hubs for minilateral security cooperation within that network. It also illustrates how China began to articulate the concept of 'natural alliance forces' (tianran tongmeng jun) in 2018, and that Beijing has subsequently expanded its own minilateral security cooperation and Chinese-style multilateralism. These initiatives share some of the characteristics of minilateralism and are seen by China as alternatives to non-alignment, even though they are not necessarily direct responses or reactions to US-led minilateral security cooperation. Instead, they indicate that China hopes to exert some influence on the regional order through the alignment of like-minded countries vis-à-vis the US-led network. The article concludes by identifying the limitations China faces in leading both minilateral and multilateral security cooperation.
Since Narendra Modi came to power, there has been an upswing in the strategic ties between India and the United States. Historically, non-alignment and, later, strategic autonomy in India’s foreign ...policy discourse have been defined in opposition to the United States. India’s foreign policy has been held back from pursuing greater strategic alignment with the United States due to its anti-American prejudice. The paper contends that, Modi has redefined the ideological framework of strategic autonomy from non-alignment to issue-based alignment, which also entails cooperating closely with the United States pertaining to the strategic threats it confronts from China in the wider Indo-Pacific region. The paper argues that Modi believes pursuing closer strategic alignment with the United States enhances India’s “strategic autonomy,” vis-à-vis the strategic threats that it confronts. Modi has also abandoned the practice of taking ideological stands and instead redefined strategic autonomy in terms of pursuing India’s national interests. The major finding of the paper is that Modi has redefined the strategic autonomy on purely realistic grounds and has strengthened the strategic ties with the United States.
Sweden is a country that has a reputation and historical legacy as being "neutral" and working for peaceful solutions to different global problems after the bitter experiences in the 18th and 19th ...centuries that saw it fall as a regional power of the Baltic Sea region in a series of conflicts with the Russian Empire. Contemporary mainstream politics and society places itself firmly in the camp of global liberalism and the stressing the importance of the trans-Atlantic partnership, which influences how Sweden views its mission and approach to global affairs. Sweden's centuries long policy of neutrality/non-alignment is being tested in an environment of deteriorating relations with Russia. This is most clearly seen in the NATO debate where a noticeable split is taking place in society along the lines of humanitarian values (those supporting neutrality/non-alignment) and "interests" (namely supposed security interests by the pro-NATO side).
India's leaders have pursued a series of ambitious agendas in international relations, driven by a sense of national destiny and civilisational mission. This article explores these different agendas ...and the strategies they shaped, noting the underlying convictions that unite them: that India's civilisational inheritance has lessons for the world, that India's status is yet to be properly respected, and that New Delhi must strive for the highest levels of autonomy India can attain in international affairs. It argues, however, that their pursuit has been confounded by domestic challenges, which inhibit India's capacity to accumulate power and exert influence.
This paper discusses how Nehru's world vision and foreign policy were shaped by his participation in the anti-colonial movement. During the Cold War years, Indian foreign policy was overwhelmingly ...guided by Nehruvian principles. Those principles were not completely overlooked even after the end of the Cold War when India made a shift in its foreign policy. Interestignly, even the most 'non-Nehruvian' government have followed some of the Nehruvian tenets. The paper also examines Nehru's idea of Non-Alignment, his approach to the Kashmir issue, relations with China, and the question of India's membership to the United Nations Security Council.
The Return of Geopolitical Blocs Leoni, Zeno; Tzinieris, Sarah
Survival (London),
03/2024, Letnik:
66, Številka:
2
Journal Article
Recenzirano
The world order appears to be reverting to geopolitical blocs with associated spheres of influence. Although the Cold War officially ended three decades ago, a cold peace has arisen, manifested in ...the return of old adversarial dynamics amid Russia's resurgence and sharpening strategic competition between China and the United States. As a result, three tentative blocs are emerging, albeit ones that are less ideologically driven than those of the Cold War: a renewed yet diminished Western bloc; a large but leaderless Eurasian bloc; and a confluence of swing states not bound to any particular hegemon. While such divisions increase the likelihood of global conflict, the West's relative political cohesion should enable it to continue to hold sway. Nonetheless, the West's ability to retain a global leadership role could yet be undermined by the emergence of an increasingly illiberal America.
In 2022, India captured global attention over its response to the war in Ukraine. While calling for both parties' return to diplomacy, India abstained from several United Nations resolutions ...condemning Russian aggression. For a country that ostensibly subscribes to the values of democracy and territorial integrity, its response appeared frustrating and contradictory, but it is broadly consistent with its long-standing policy of non-alignment. Although India's relationship with China is increasingly contentious, New Delhi is not yet fully convinced that it is in India's interest to swing westwards. The country's relations with Russia and China are deep, complex and substantive. In addition to the military and economic benefits it derives from its connection with Russia, New Delhi and Moscow share an avowed preference for a more equal, multipolar world. India will eventually have to reflect on the extent to which it can sustain its balancing act.
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