Today, consumers are faced with an abundance of information on the internet; accordingly, it is hard for them to reach the vital information they need. One of the reasonable solutions in modern ...society is implementing information filtering. Some researchers implemented a recommender system as filtering to increase customers’ experience in social media and e-commerce. This research focuses on the combination of two methods in the recommender system, that is, demographic and content-based filtering, commonly it is called hybrid filtering. In this research, item products are collected using the data crawling method from the big three e-commerce in Indonesia (Shopee, Tokopedia, and Bukalapak). This experiment has been implemented in the web application using the Flask framework to generate products’ recommended items. This research employs the IMDb weight rating formula to get the best score lists and TF-IDF with Cosine similarity to create the similarity between products to produce related items.
Online retailers are increasingly using third-party online marketplaces (e.g., Amazon, Taobao) as an alternative sales channel to their website. While cross-channel sales elasticities have been ...established for many sales channel combinations (e.g., adding bricks to clicks), we lack an understanding of whether the use of third-party marketplaces grows or cannibalizes a retailer's sales. Practitioners argue that firms can build their e-commerce business through acquiring customers by selling on the marketplace. Indeed, a marketplace could complement a retailer's offering (e.g., acquiring new customer segments), although inventory effects might mitigate this complementarity. Alternatively, cannibalization might occur from losing customers from one's website to the online marketplace. The present research investigates which of the two opposing forces prevails using a time series of category sales data from one of the largest global marketplace sellers. The authors use vector autoregressive modeling to show that marketplace sales increase sales on a retailer's website (0.014% for every 1% in marketplace sales). This effect is strongest for categories with large choice and low product prices. Acquiring customers through the marketplace might be cheaper than through other sources (estimated at 24% of initial sales). However, online retailers should be aware that this strategy strengthens the marketplace and may have potential negative long-term consequences (e.g., through marketplace control of the customer relationship).
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•Retailers' sales on online marketplaces increase sales on their own website.•This effect is strongest for categories with large choice and low product prices.•The positive effect of marketplace sales dominates cannibalization.•The long-term effects of selling on a marketplace may be harmful for a retailer.
Online marketplaces are rapidly shifting the trajectory of the e‐commerce landscape. Brand manufacturers are starkly more dependent on online marketplaces, and for most brands, marketplace presence ...is not optional but mandatory. At this point, brand executives face a pivotal question in addressing their marketplace presence: What product selling (or distribution) approach should be adopted to leverage this channel for their brand? At its core, there are effectively two options offered to brand executives: selling to the online marketplace (as a 1p vendor); and selling on the marketplace platform (as a 3p seller). Whereas the conventional 1p vendor model is quintessentially the entry point to an online marketplace, some brand manufacturers migrate to the 3p seller model. Many others, however, avoid pulling the 3p trigger. In this paper, we address these two options a brand manufacturer has for selling (or allowing sales of) his product on a marketplace. On the grounds that online marketplaces retain brands at distinct price/quality tiers so as to be both comprehensive and robust, we propose a model of competition between two brand manufacturers whose products (in a category) are vertically differentiated on a quality/performance attribute and a convex marginal production cost is incurred for providing the higher quality. Given there is no single selling strategy on a marketplace that is ideal for all brand manufacturers and strategies would work the best under different market and competitive conditions, we investigate the impact of where a brand stands (vis‐á‐vis his competitor) on the two dimensions of a product‐attribute space on the transitions of 1p brands to 3p sellers on the marketplace platform. We also extend the analysis to the setting where an online retailer decides on whether or not to add a marketplace platform to her existing online marketplace and (if so) on the referral fee percentage at which the product category would be listed.
•Investigates the effect of search ads on conversion probability and selling duration.•Examines the moderating role of transaction experience and organizational type.•Search ads increase conversion ...probability and shorten selling duration.•The effect on conversion probability is higher for new (individual) advertisers than for regular (business) advertisers.•The effect on selling duration is higher for regular (individual) advertisers than for new (business) advertisers.
This study examines how paid search advertising affects conversion probability and selling duration on e-marketplace platforms, as well as how these effects are moderated by two advertiser characteristics: transaction experience (regular vis-à-vis new) and organizational type (business vis-à-vis individual). We develop a model that includes both conversion incidence and selling duration, thus accounting for the correlation between the variables. The proposed model is calibrated using data on one million randomly selected used cars traded in an online marketplace. The results reveal that search ads increase conversion probability significantly, by a remarkable 65.26%, and shorten selling duration by 3.51 days, on average. The effect on conversion probability is greater for new (individual) advertisers than it is for their regular (business) counterparts. By contrast, the shortened selling duration is more pronounced for regular (individual) advertisers than it is for new (business) advertisers. Finally, we discuss the implications of these findings for marketplace sellers and platform companies.
This study investigates an e-commerce platform's incentive to voluntarily disclose demand information to an upstream manufacturer. In contrast to previous studies that emphasize the platform's ...mandatory (or ex-ante) information disclosure, this study examines voluntary (or ex-post) information disclosure, which allows the platform to selectively decide whether to perform information disclosure based on the level of forecast demand. The typical online selling channels in which the platform or the manufacturer (or both) play the role of seller are identified as reselling, marketplace, and hybrid cases. In each transaction case, the interactions between the platform's information disclosure strategy, the level of forecast demand, the platform's forecasting capability, the degree of demand uncertainty, and channel substitutability are analyzed. We find that information on good market demand should be withheld in the reselling case, information indicating a slightly below-average market condition should be withheld in the marketplace case, and information on good or poor demand should be withheld in the hybrid case. The platform is more likely to perform information disclosure as the forecasting capability or the degree of demand uncertainty increases. Moreover, both the platform and the manufacturer can benefit from a well-formulated voluntary information disclosure strategy. Our findings show e-commerce platforms how to better exploit demand forecast information in a voluntary disclosure setting and provide an explanation for practices such as their focus on improving their forecasting capability and market potential.
•This paper studies a platform's voluntary information disclosure to a manufacturer.•Three types of transaction scenarios (reselling, agency, hybrid) are considered.•The platform is more likely to disclose information if the forecasting capability or demand uncertainty is high.•A higher demand forecasting ability or demand uncertainty level may promote the platform to be more inclined to disclose information.
With the increasing popularity of platform economics, supply chain members are facing strategic decisions regarding whether to introduce online marketplace platforms in addition to their existing ...brick-and-mortar sales channels. Our study investigates this problem by quantitatively modelling and evaluating four different channel structures defined by whether the manufacturer, the retailer, neither or both choose to adopt the platform to enhance their sales. It is shown that the introduction of a marketplace platform is beneficial for supply chain members only if the degree of competition among different channels is low. Moreover, modes MR, MN and NN are shown as possible equilibrium channel structures depending on the degree of channel competition and the platform fee rate, and it is found that the Nash and Stackelberg equilibriums coincide, indicating that there is no first-mover advantage in platform introduction. Some extended cases are explored by incorporating the endogenous platform fee rate, platform spillover effect, and asymmetric market base, and the robustness of the results is analysed.
•Introducing marketplace platform is beneficial only if the competition is not so fierce.•The decision sequence on marketplace platform introduction leads to consistent equilibrium channel structures.•Introducing marketplace platform by manufacturer can reduce double marginalization effect.•Spillover has a significant effect on the channel structure preference.
In this paper, we explore the effect of asymmetric service information, including service cost information and service quality information, on fulfillment service contract in the presence of channel ...selection and pricing decisions in a one-principal-one-agent relationship. We characterize the service contract terms as well as the pricing and channel selection decisions under four scenarios, depending on whether service cost information or service quality information is private. The optimal contract terms critically depend on the unit operation cost of the offline retail channel. If service quality is contractable, the firm pays information rent for private cost information, and its size only depends on the contract terms of the high-cost service provider. When service quality is not contractable, asymmetric service quality information reduces the overall operational efficiency only if service cost is also private information. We also numerically verify the influence of asymmetric information on the firm's optimal decisions and compare the optimal results for different kinds of service contracts. The main finding of our study is that channel decisions can be used by the retail firm to weaken the information advantage of the service provider. Therefore, when designing service contract, the firm should carefully consider the interaction between channel structure and service information availability.
•This paper examines the impact of micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) status in marketplace lending.•We find MSMEs borrowers are less likely to obtain loans and usually set lower ...interest rates, larger loan amounts, and shorter loan maturity.•We also find MSMEs borrowers tend to miss their repayments and attract lower bid ratios from lenders.•Our results reveal that online marketplace lending is a chance for MSMEs to apply for loans, but its inclusion is limited.
This paper studies the impact of micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) status in marketplace lending. Using data from one of the most prominent Chinese online lending marketplaces, we find that MSMEs borrowers are less likely to obtain loans and usually set lower interest rates, larger loan amounts, and shorter loan maturity. We also find that MSMEs borrowers tend to miss their repayments and attract lower bid ratios from lenders. Taken together, our results reveal that online marketplace lending is a chance for MSMEs to obtain funding, but its inclusion is limited.
