Private set computation over multi-owner databases is an important problem with many applications — the most well studied of which is private set intersection (PSI). This article proposes Prism , a ...secret-sharing based approach to compute private set operations (i.e., intersection and union, as well as aggregates such as count, sum, average, maximum, minimum, and median) over outsourced databases belonging to multiple owners. Prism enables data owners to pre-load the data onto non-colluding servers and exploits the additive and multiplicative properties of secret-shares to compute the above-listed operations. Prism takes (at most) two rounds of communication between non-colluding servers (storing the secret-shares) and the querier for executing the above-mentioned operations, resulting in a very efficient implementation. Prism also supports result verification techniques for each operation to detect malicious adversaries. Experimental results show that Prism scales both in terms of the number of data owners and database sizes, to which prior approaches do not scale.
In online outsourcing platforms where clients (buyers) can procure diverse services from freelancers (service providers), skill certification systems are usually offered for freelancers to signal ...their private service expertise. This study considers a multi-stage online outsourcing context where the freelancers may participate in skill certification before bidding for a client's service contract in a buyer-determined reverse auction. The paper examines the interactions of the freelancers' certification, bidding, and service effort decisions with the client's design and award of the outsourcing contract, and it highlights the impacts of the certification system on the transaction parties' decision results. Moreover, the paper also investigates the platform's adoption and optimization decisions towards the certification system. The results show that freelancers would participate in certification, if and only if their expertise exceeds a threshold that is decreasing in both the transaction efficiency (which decreases in the commission rates charged by the platform) and certification informativeness. The client should set a smaller project scope and a lower penalty for low-quality delivery when the certification informativeness is higher or the transaction efficiency is lower. Both the client and the freelancers are more likely to benefit from the certification system when the certification informativeness or transaction efficiency is higher, or when the certification cost is lower. For the platform, the certification system is valuable, and its value is increasing in the certification informativeness. The platform can optimize the commission rates such that the resulting transaction efficiency is decreasing in the certification informativeness and increasing in the certification cost.
Two types of information technology (IT) outsourcing governance-contractual and relational-are commonly employed to address different goals in IT service management in outsourcing arrangements. ...Contractual governance helps improve efficiency in an outsourcing relationship, whereas relational governance facilitates satisfying changing business needs. Past literature argues that both forms of governance are important and that an appropriate balance between them is necessary. This study finds that these two forms of governance often conflict with one another. We contribute to the research on IT outsourcing governance by opening the black box of the evolutionary process of achieving ambidexterity in this context. Organizations shift their focus between contractual and relational forms of governance in an attempt to develop practices that address conflicts between the two forms. We present the findings from a qualitative study of an organization that outsourced its IT services. Our findings reveal how a balance between contractual and relational governance can be achieved through a process we call the ambidexterity pendulum.
The coordination of effort within and among different expert groups is a central feature of contemporary organizations. Within the existing literature, however, a dichotomy has emerged in our ...understanding of the role played by codification in coordinating expert groups. One strand of literature emphasizes codification as a process that supports coordination by enabling the storage and ready transfer of knowledge. In contrast, another strand highlights the persistent differences between expert groups that create boundaries to the transfer of knowledge, seeing coordination as dependent on the quality of the reciprocal interactions between groups and individuals. Our research helps to resolve such contested understandings of the coordinative role played by codification. By focusing on the offshore-outsourcing of knowledge-intensive services, we examine the role played by codification when expertise was coordinated between client staff and onsite and offshore vendor personnel in a large-scale outsourcing contract between TATA Consultancy Services (TCS) and ABN AMRO bank. A number of theoretical contributions flow from our analysis of the case study, helping to move our understanding beyond the dichotomized views of codification outlined above. First, our study adds to previous work where codification has been seen as a static concept by demonstrating the multiple, coexisting and complementary roles that codification may play. We examine the dynamic nature of codification and show changes in the relative importance of these different roles in coordinating distributed expertise over time. Second, we reconceptualize the commonly accepted view of codification as focusing on the replication and diffusion of knowledge by developing the notion of the codification of the "knower" as complementary to the codification of knowledge. Unlike previous studies of expertise directories, codification of the knower does not involve representing expertise in terms of occupational skills or competences but enables the reciprocal interrelating of expertise required by more unstructured tasks. PUBLICATION ABSTRACT
The continued growth of logistics outsourcing and dependence on third-party logistics (3PL) providers highlights the need for firms to strategically consider their dependence on their supply chain. ...We draw on resource dependency theory to propose guanxi (a cultural tradition in China of interpersonal connections that facilitate a mutual exchange of favors) as a dependency-coping strategy. Integrating transaction cost economics, we propose the effectiveness of guanxi as a dependence coping strategy is contingent on the level of exchange hazards (i.e., uncertainty and asset specificity) in logistics outsourcing. Based on data collected from 149 3PL users in China, we found that guanxi is a more potent strategy in highly uncertain environments and less relevant when extensive relationship-specific assets are involved. Implications and directions of future research are discussed.
Obtaining timely and accurate traffic information is one of the most important problems in intelligent transportation system, which will make vehicles run smoothly, avoid road congestion, save road ...running time and reduce vehicle energy consumption. In the current Internet of Vehicles system, the traffic management center can learn from the feedback information of all vehicles to improve the ability of decision-making and traffic command. However, the existing feedback mechanism does not respond to the spatial-temporal characteristics of data in time, due to the lack of communication capability of the current equipment. So, it cannot meet the requirements of ultra-low delay, high reliability and high security in the Internet of Vehicles. To solve this problem, this paper proposes a blockchain-based proxy vote and revocation scheme for decision feedback in Internet of Vehicles, which allows the intelligent system to ignore the unevenness and heterogeneity in the 6G technology. In addition, blockchain technology notarizes the vote data of vehicles and outsources microservices. Secondly, we use the attributes of decision-related nodes instead of their identities to enable anonymous vote. Smart contracts can automatically expand the scalability of outsourced microservices. Finally, the security proof of the proposed scheme ensures the security and consistency of outsourced microservices. The simulation results also show that our scheme greatly improves the efficiency of voting feedback.
•We study the manufacturing and procurement outsourcing strategies of two competing OEMs.•We investigate the impacts of component discount rate and fixed manufacturing investment cost.•Our analysis ...reveals the strategic interplay between manufacturing outsourcing and procurement outsourcing.•A deeper supplier discount and a larger market potential may hurt the OEMs and CM.
To cope with market competition and focus on core competence, many Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) choose to outsource their product manufacturing and/or component procurement functions to Contract Manufactures (CMs). In this paper, we aim to investigate the strategic interplay between manufacturing outsourcing and procurement outsourcing in a three-tier supply chain consisting of one component supplier, one common CM, and two competing OEMs. Each OEM has four outsourcing strategies: no outsourcing, “manufacturing-only” outsourcing, “procurement-only” outsourcing, and “manufacturing + procurement” outsourcing. We build a two-stage game model, where two OEMs simultaneously choose their outsourcing strategies in the first stage; in the second stage, the CM and two OEMs make wholesale prices and quantity decisions based on the outsourcing structure formed in the first stage. We find that OEMs’ equilibrium outsourcing strategies depend on the discount rate of component price and the fixed investment cost of manufacturing. Our analysis also reveals the strategic relationship between manufacturing outsourcing and procurement outsourcing: OEMs would not outsource procurement until the product manufacturing is outsourced. Moreover, there may exist Prisoners’ Dilemma, where both OEMs earn higher profits when they choose “manufacturing + procurement” outsourcing, but neither OEM is willing to outsource procurement. Interestingly, we show that OEMs’ and CM’s profits may decrease with the discount rate and market potential, but increase in the fixed investment cost.
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