Politician characteristic regression discontinuity (PCRD) designs leveraging close elections are widely used to isolate effects of an elected politician characteristic on downstream outcomes. Unlike ...standard regression discontinuity designs, treatment is defined by a predetermined characteristic that could affect a politician's victory margin. I prove that, by conditioning on politicians who win close elections, PCRD estimators identify the effect of the specific characteristic of interest and all compensating differentials—candidate‐level characteristics that ensure elections remain close between candidates who differ in the characteristic of interest. Avoiding this asymptotic bias generally requires assuming either that the characteristic of interest does not affect candidate vote shares or that no compensating differential affects the outcome. Because theories of voting behavior suggest that neither strong assumption usually holds, I further analyze the implications for interpreting continuity tests and consider if and how covariate adjustment, bounding, and recharacterizing treatment can mitigate the posttreatment bias afflicting PCRD designs.
Why is discontent with politicians highest among less‐educated citizens? Supplementing explanations concerning a lack of resources and knowledge, we examine the cultural distance to many a politician ...perceived by this group. Inspired by qualitative studies mapping the worldviews of people from the lower social strata, we explore less‐educated citizens’ perceptions of politicians using in‐depth (group) interviews carried out in various regions of the Netherlands (n = 26). Our analysis indicates that this group regards politicians as culturally distant “others” and that this perception goes hand in hand with specific negative evaluations of politicians. This improves our understanding of the much‐reported political discontent of these citizens. In moving beyond the often mentioned unspecific divide between the “people” and the “elite”, our analysis reveals that our interviewees: (i) consider politicians to be insensitive to the lived experiences of the “common” people, and therefore, question their legitimacy and the policies they propose; (ii) resent their communication styles, which they describe as “beating about the bush” and perceive to be emblematic of indecisiveness and a lack of integrity; and (iii) accuse them of superiority signaling, inspiring feelings of misrecognition and opposition. We conclude with detailing the implications of our findings for (future) research.
The Geography of Financial Misconduct PARSONS, CHRISTOPHER A.; SULAEMAN, JOHAN; TITMAN, SHERIDAN
The Journal of finance (New York),
10/2018, Letnik:
73, Številka:
5
Journal Article
Recenzirano
Financial misconduct (FM) rates differ widely between major U.S. cities, up to a factor of 3. Although spatial differences in enforcement and firm characteristics do not account for these patterns, ...city-level norms appear to be very important. For example, FM rates are strongly related to other unethical behavior, involving politicians, doctors, and (potentially unfaithful) spouses, in the city.
„Visionen für Europa“. Mit diesem Titel begann am 16. Februar 2012 die Veranstaltungsreihe, zu der Bundesminister a.D. Dr. Theo Waigel den Impuls gegeben und die Schirmherrschaft übernommen hatte. ...Bei der neunten Veranstaltung im August dieses Jahr ging es um die Frage „Was wird aus dem Europa Helmut Kohls?“. Waigel machte in der Podiumsdiskussion sehr deutlich, dass es nicht nur einen personellen Generationenwechsel gab: „Wir brauchen heute nicht die große Vision für Europa. Wir brauchen realistische Vorgaben … für das Projekt Europa.“ Das war der Anstoß, um die Reihe „Visionen für Europa“ nun als „Meilensteine für Europa“ weiter zu führen. Meilensteine sind besondere Etappen auf dem Weg zu einem klar definierten Ziel.
Although the supply chain (SC) literature has discussed the influence of the political environment on global SC decisions, the role of political leaders has been overlooked. To fill this research ...void, we predict and show that the turnover of a country's top political leader (hereafter, “politician turnover”) increases policy uncertainty in the country, which drives multinational corporations (MNCs) to adjust their SC involvement there. We also identify three politician‐related contingency factors: the market‐friendliness of the successor relative to the incumbent, the length of the successor's political career, and corruption in the turnover country. In an analysis of politician turnover events from 2003 to 2018 and the global supplier‐customer relationships of US‐incorporated MNCs, we find that politician turnover causes MNCs to reduce SC involvement (measured as the proportions of an MNC's customers, suppliers, and the transaction volume that are located in the turnover country). The negative effect of politician turnover on SC involvement is exacerbated by corruption in the turnover country, mitigated when the successor has a long political career, and exacerbated when the successor is less market‐friendly than the incumbent; the effect becomes positive when the successor is more market‐friendly than the incumbent.
Highlights
The turnover of a country's top political leader (hereafter, “politician turnover”) increases policy uncertainty in the country, which drives multinational corporations (MNCs) to, on average, reduce their supply chain involvement there in the turnover year.
The effect of politician turnover on MNCs' supply chain involvement varies upon the successor and country characteristics: The negative effect on MNCs' supply chain involvement is more profound when the successor is less market‐friendly than the incumbent, the successor is with a short political career, or the country is highly corruptive; the effect turns to positive when successor is more market‐friendly than the incumbent.
Policymakers can use these findings to form proactive and accurate estimations of the impacts of politician turnover on economics, employment, and even security in supply‐chain‐related sectors.
Research has shown that politicians' perceptions of public opinion are subject to social projection. When estimating the opinions of voters on a broad range of issues, politicians tend to assume that ...their own preferences are shared by voters. This article revisits this finding and adds to the literature in three ways. First, it makes a conceptual contribution by bringing together different approaches to the analysis of projection and its consequences. Second, relying on data from surveys with politicians (
n
= 866) in four countries (Belgium, Canada, Germany, and Switzerland) conducted between March 2018 and September 2019, it shows that there is more projection in politicians' estimations of their partisan electorate than in their estimations of the general public or of their geographic district. Third, comparing the data on politician projection with data from parallel surveys with citizens, the article reveals that—at least in three out of the four countries studied here—elected politicians are not better at avoiding erroneous projection than ordinary citizens. The article discusses the implications of these findings for the workings of representative democracy.
As a result of the steady rise of populist parties and politicians all over the world – and particularly since the Brexit referendum and the election of Donald Trump – populism research has become ...increasingly popular and widespread. The field, however, also faces some tricky challenges. First, it is easy to confuse populism with related concepts like, for instance, ‘nativism’ and ‘Euroscepticism’. This brings the risk of sloppy conceptualisation, and, as a result, invalid inferences. Second, populism research remains relatively detached from adjacent fields, and fruitful fertilisation across literatures is still rather uncommon. In order to deal with these challenges, populism research should become both more and less focused. How can these two seemingly conflicting recommendations be reconciled? When it comes to conceptualisation/categorisation strategies and drawing conclusions from studies by other researchers, populism scholars should employ a narrow framework and be precise, distinctive and consistent. Yet when it comes to exploring the literature in search of new hypotheses, scholars should employ a more open mind‐set. After all, theories developed in adjacent fields can inspire populism scholars to formulate innovative new questions and expectations.
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