Much early public choice theory focused on alleged pathologies of democratic legislatures, portraying them as irrational, manipulable, or subject to capture. Recent years have seen the emergence of a ...new strand of argument, reaffirming the old skepticism of legislatures but suggesting that transferring power from legislatures to chief executives offers a solution. Just as the earlier prescriptions ignored the pathologies of the agencies empowered to check and constrain legislatures, so the new scholarship overlooks the pathologies of executive power. The primary sources of congressional dysfunction call for reforms that would strengthen Congress instead of hobbling it in new ways that exacerbate the drift toward authoritarian presidentialism in the American system. Executive aggrandizement is a consequence of decades of institutional malfunction, worsened by right-wing attacks on legislative capacity. This has been the enduring impact of the public choice movement since the 1950s, but its twenty-first century offshoot is especially malign.
This article provides a critical review and discussion of current literature on technology transfer, incubators, and academic entrepreneurship. Drawing upon the notion of robustness in social systems ...and public choice theory, we review, code, and taxonomize 166 studies to assess the likelihood that these initiatives will generate innovation and economic growth. We find that academic entrepreneurship initiatives are characterized by conflicting goals, weak incentive structures for universities and academics, and are contextually dependent upon factors such as university strength. Our results suggest that there are critical boundary conditions that are unlikely to be fulfilled when universities and policymakers enact policies to support academic entrepreneurship initiatives. Policymakers therefore need to be cautious in the potential design of such initiatives. We discuss how technology transfer from universities might be better achieved through alternative mechanisms such as contract research, licensing, consulting and increased labor mobility among researchers.
This article provides and tests a theoretical framework with a multilevel (country–city) nested model to analyze the relationship between national business regulations (NBRs) and city level ...entrepreneurship. While public interest theory predicts a positive relationship between NBR and city level entrepreneurship, public choice theory predicts the opposite, a negative relationship. Based on multilevel analysis for a matched country–city panel of 228 cities across 20 European countries for the years 2004 to 2009, the empirical evidence from panel data estimation explains how changes in NBRs influence changes in city level entrepreneurial activity over time.
Social scientists have created a variety of datasets in recent years that quantify political regimes, but these often provide little data on phases of regime transitions. Our aim is to contribute to ...filling this gap, by providing an update and expansion of the Democracy-Dictatorship data by Cheibub et al. (
Public Choice, 143
, 67–101,
2010
), originally introduced by Alvarez et al. (
Studies in Comparative International Development, 31
(2), 3–36,
1996
), where we add the following three features: First, we expand coverage to a total of 192 sovereign countries and 16 currently self-governing territories between 1950 and 2018, including periods under colonial rule for more than ninety entities. Second, we provide more institutional details that are deemed of importance in the relevant literature. Third, we include a new, self-created indicator of successful and failed coups d’état, which is currently the most complete of its kind. We further illustrate the usefulness of the new dataset by documenting the importance of political institutions under colonial rule for democratic development after independence, making use of our much more detailed data on colonial institutions. Findings indicate that more participatory colonial institutions have a positive and lasting effect for democratic development after transition to independence.
There is a rich literature on the emergence of new public management in the 1980s yet surprisingly little about the historical and social lineages of this movement. The scholarship on public ...management generally suggests that it was born out of the neoliberal critique of the state. The public sector would have thus borrowed corporate practices concerned with performance in order to instil market-like competition and make efficiency gains. This article challenges this reading by showing that concerns with performance management emerged instead from new planning technologies developed in the US military sector. I argue that these planning practices, initially developed at the RAND corporation, would radically transform governance by changing the way in which decision makers consider data about performance and use it to develop strategies or policies. I then explore the impact of this new approach on both corporate and public governance. I show how these ideas were translated for business studies and public administration in order to radically transform both fields and 'make them more scientific'. As I show, this process contributed directly to the rise of what became called public management and provided new planning tools that radically transformed how we think about governance.
Abstract
This paper contributes to the literature on externalities and their classification by reconciling insights from transaction costs theory with James Buchanan’s and Elinor Ostrom’s analyses of ...property rights and institutional diversity. We critique the dominant Pigouvian analysis, which assumes only two forms of institutions—namely, governments and private markets—that can internalize externalities. We develop a new taxonomy of externalities that provides relevant conceptual space for a wide array of institutions that the market-versus-state dichotomy obscures. The proposed taxonomy considers two key classes of often-conflated attributes: (1) the scale of externalities, and (2) the assignability, enforceability, and tradability of property rights. This approach enriches the Coasean (transaction cost) perspective by allowing us to unbundle transaction costs in a manner that extends its applicability to nonmarket situations in which market-based transactions are either not permitted or technically infeasible. Thus, by integrating insights from two distinct Public Choice schools, we broaden the theory of externalities to not only encompass market exchanges but also to incorporate cases in which property rights are, and will remain, unclear. We conclude that institutional diversity can offer adaptable solutions to tackle medium- and large-scale externalities.
We review articles about corporate political activity (CPA) published in Business & Society since its beginnings 60 years ago and in a set of other leading management journals over the past decade. ...We present evidence that most studies of CPA use the political markets’ perspective. Under the premise that the contemporary political environment has changed significantly since the inception of the political markets’ perspective, our review asks two interconnected questions. First, to what degree have changes in the political environment challenged the ability of the political markets’ perspective to understand the pillars of politics: issues, institutions, interests, and information? Second, to what degree have CPA scholars augmented or diversified their theoretical arguments to accommodate these changes in the political environment? We document the CPA literature across these dimensions and questions and note that many scholars are already adopting other theories side by side with the political markets’ perspective.