En este trabajo se analizan los efectos perjudiciales para los derechos humanos del Covid-19 en España y la necesaria reacción de los instrumentos legales del Estado de Derecho.
The last decade has seen increasing demands for greater accountability in digital governance. What, however, does accountability require and what normative goods does it serve? This article develops ...a general framework for assessing digital accountability focused on four normative goods: openness, non-arbitrariness, effectiveness and publicness. As the article will evidence, claims for digital accountability often refer to deficits relating to one or more of these goods. While scholarly attention has deservedly focused on tying powerful digital actors to rule of law guarantees, the article argues that accountability offers an important normative yardstick to allow citizens to contest digital decisions beyond strict legality. The framework therefore provides a basis for both conceptually disaggregating and normatively forwarding accountability claims in the digital sphere.
Under Australian law, the requirement that parties to a contract must co-operate with each other manifests in at least four distinct duties or standards: (i) each party must co-operate in performing ...acts reasonably necessary to achieve contractual objectives; (ii) each party must not prevent or delay the other party in performing the contract; (iii) each party must do what is reasonably necessary to ensure that the other party enjoys the benefit of the contract; and (iv) each party must not undermine the purpose of any express promise that it has made. These duties and standards exist as default rules given effect, in most cases, as terms implied in law into all contracts. They are justified by the need to protect the bargain or exchange embodied by the contract - the performance interests of the parties. Hence, the scope of each duty or standard is defined through a normative assessment of what is necessary and appropriate in terms of protecting the bargain; the court strikes a balance between maintenance of the bargain and respect for the freedom of each party to act in self-interest.
When we talk about the challenges of the European and Albanian legislation on the surrender of persons wanted by criminal justice, the picture of the Albanian law and the operation of the law comes ...to mind. But today more and more measures are being taken to develop the legislative power and its functioning. These measures have also been taken in drafting and in administrative and judicial execution.
Today, there is more and more talk about justice reforms; such are the challenges that Albania faces when it comes to cooperation with the EU in relation to the procedures for handing over persons wanted by law. It is such a challenge, because Albania’s legislation must be in line with that of the EU. When we talk about compliance or Acquis communautaire, we mean the interoperability that the legislative, judicial and executive powers must follow.
Talking about the justice reform in Albania, we understand and analyse more closely the issue of corruption. The globalization of criminal activities has created a need to strengthen international cooperation. The investigation, prosecution and control of crime cannot be confined within national borders.
The principle of free will stipulates that the contract, in terms of ordering the legal consequences and determining the type and nature of the agreement between the parties, should not conflict with ...certain rules. Given that the overwhelming majority of jurists and lawyers have considered the principle of free will as the origin of Article 10 of the Civil Code, as well as the rule of law of the subsidiary, but there is no consensus among them on the meanings and definitions of the principle of free will, in this paper, the impact of free will on the creation of new impacts on the long-term temporary marriage contract is examined.
Blockchain technology was created as a response to the trust crisis that swept the world in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. Bitcoin and other blockchain-based systems were presented as a ...“trustless” alternative to existing financial institutions and even governments. Yet, while the trustless nature of blockchain technology has been heavily questioned, little research has been done as to what blockchain technologies actually bring to the table in place of trust. This article draws from the extensive academic discussion on the concepts of “trust” and “confidence” to argue that blockchain technology is not a ‘trustless technology’ but rather a ‘confidence machine’. First, the article provides a review of the multifaceted conceptualisations of trust and confidence, and the relationship between these two concepts. Second, the claim is made that blockchain technology relies on cryptographic rules, mathematics, and game-theoretical incentives in order to increase confidence in the operations of a computational system. Yet, such an increase in confidence ultimately relies on the proper operation and governance of the underlying blockchain-based network, which requires trusting a variety of actors. Third, the article turns to legal, constitutional and polycentric governance theory to explore the governance challenges of blockchain-based systems, in light of the tension between procedural confidence and trust.
•Blockchain technology is not a trustless technology but rather a confidence machine.•Blockchain technology increase confidence in the operations of a computational system.•Confidence in a blockchain system depends upon its underlying governance structure.•The governance of a blockchain system requires trusting a distributed web of actors.•Constitutional & polycentric governance theory can help improve blockchain governance.
PREFACE Baird, Tanner
Texas review of law & politics,
04/2022, Letnik:
26, Številka:
3
Journal Article
In his Article, Bernstein examines that word in the context of its common law backdrop and the natural application of its original meaning. Hiram Sasser and Lea Patterson argue that the Religious ...Freedom Restoration Act's status as a superstatute limits the degree of immunity that Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act confers on social media companies that censor religious speech. ...in her student note, Ingrid Jernudd analyzes Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930.
The primary focus of this book is on a specific outcome of the rule of law: the practical enforcement of laws and policies, and the determinants of this enforcement, or lack thereof. Are there ...significant and persistent differences in implementation across countries? Why are some laws and policies more systematically enforced than others? Are “good†? laws likely to be enacted, and if not, what stands in the way?
We answer these questions using a theoretical framework and detailed empirical data and illustrate with case studies from Morocco, Tunisia and Jordan. We believe that the best way to understand the variation in the drafting and implementation of laws and policies is to examine the interests and incentives of those responsible for these tasks †” policymakers and bureaucrats. If laws and their enforcement offer concrete benefits to these ruling elites, they are more likely to be systematically enforced. If they don’t, implementation is selective, discretionary, if not nil.
Our first contribution is in extending the application of the concept of the rule of law beyond its traditional focus on specific organizations like the courts and the police, to economic sectors such as customs, taxation and land inheritance, in a search for a direct causal relationship with economic development outcomes. Instead of limiting ourselves to a particular type of organization or a legalistic approach to the rule of law, we present a broader theory of how laws are made and implemented across different types of sectors and organizations.
Our second contribution is in demonstrating how powerful interests affect implementation outcomes. The incentives elites have to build and support rule-of-law institutions derive from the distribution of power in society, which is partly a historical given. The point we make is that it is not deterministic. Realigning the incentive structures for reform among key actors and organizations, through accountability and competition, can dramatically improve the chances that rule-of-law institutions will take root. On the other hand, building the capacity of organizations without first changing institutional incentives is likely to lead to perverse outcomes.
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