The COVID-19 (coronavirus) crisis was a reminder, if any were needed, that criminal creativity thrives in times of chaos, exploiting people’s fears. Unsafe face masks, counterfeit drugs, and suspect ...medical equipment flooded the market, touted as miracle cures against the coronavirus by unscrupulous actors wanting to turn a quick profit. Companies with no record in health won big government contracts and, as people’s situation deteriorated, organized crime stepped in to lend a “helping hand” to those suffering financial distress. Where most people saw a global public health and
economic crisis, criminals saw an opportunity. What this criminal behavior, indeed almost all financial economic crime, has in common is that the funds involved move through the formal financial system. The service providers that execute those transactions are in a good position to gather firsthand intelligence on what is happening. For this reason, banks and other financial institutions have anti-money-laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) obligations to find out who is paying whom and why and, if necessary, to alert the authorities. Financial institutions are the first line of defense against this criminal behavior; they are the gatekeepers to the international financial system.
Purpose
The purpose of the study is to examine the available literature to comprehend what the underground banking system is, for what purposes this method is used and how policymakers should proceed ...to address this issue.
Design/methodology/approach
The approach involved conducting this study and combining it with a critical analysis of the available literature as well as the available historical data. The sources the study has explored include government documents, public hearings, academic articles, case studies and articles available on the internet.
Findings
The study revealed prevention of illegal proceeds is critical, still regulating one entity, is a phenomenon of Boyle’s law, “squeezing the balloon”. If one end of the balloon is squeezed, making the volume smaller, the pressure inside increases, making the un-squeezed part of the balloon expand out. The real issue is not how criminals transfer their illegal earnings; it is the criminals themselves. Hence, the policy decision on this issue needs to be carefully considered.
Research limitations/implications
Due to the complexity of the operating system of Undiyal, this study had a number of limitations, as do many others. Firstly, there are no records of the Undiyal agents or the volumes of transactions publicly available. However, comprehending the scope of the underground operation that exists in the country is quite difficult.
Practical implications
The study contributes to the academic researchers grasping what type of future research should be focused on in this area according to the study.
Social implications
From the point of view of its practical application, the study seeks to resolve social issues that the middle-class population experiences on a daily basis and that have a huge and adverse impact on GDP.
Originality/value
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is an original contribution.
Purpose
Banditry and terrorism constitute serious security risks in Nigeria. This follows the fact that Nigeria is rated as one of the leading states in the world that is plagued by terrorism. ...Terrorists and bandits usually embark on predicate crimes such as kidnapping, smuggling, narcotics trade, and similar trades to finance their terrorist enterprises in Nigeria. The funds realized by criminals from nefarious sources such as sales of narcotics and ransom from kidnapping are usually laundered to make their criminal enterprises self-sustaining. Thus, all “dirty” money is laundered so as not to attract the attention of law enforcement agents. The funds realized through receipt of ransom from kidnapping, smuggling or funds from sponsors are laundered through channels such as bureau de change, which are difficult to monitor by the Nigerian authorities due, in part, to flaws and loopholes in the current anti-money laundering and anti-terrorist laws. This paper aims to adopt a doctrinal and qualitative desktop research methodology. In this regard, the current anti-money laundering and anti-terrorist laws are discussed to explore possible measures that could be adopted to remedy the flaws and loopholes in such laws and combat money laundering and financing of terrorism in Nigeria.
Design/methodology/approach
The article analyses the regulation and combating of money laundering and terrorist financing activities in Nigeria. In this regard, a doctrinal and qualitative research method is used to explore the flaws in the Nigerian anti-money laundering laws so as to recommend possible remedies in respect thereof.
Findings
It is hoped that policymakers and other relevant persons will use the recommendations provided in this article to enhance the curbing of money laundering and terrorist financing activities in Nigeria.
Research limitations/implications
The article is not based on empirical research.
Practical implications
This study is important and vital to all policymakers, lawyers, law students and regulatory bodies in Nigeria and other countries globally.
Social implications
The study seeks to curb money laundering and terrorist financing activities in Nigeria.
Originality/value
The study is based on original research which is focused on the regulation and combating of money laundering and terrorist financing activities in Nigeria.
Purpose
Money laundering (ML) has become a significant challenge all over the world today. Trade-based money laundering (TBML) is a type of ML that poses a hazard to any country. In recent years, ...developed and developing countries have pursued liberal policies for international financial markets. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) defines TBML as the process of concealing criminal earnings and shifting value through trade transactions in an attempt to justify their illicit origins. As international financial markets have improved ML controls, criminals have turned to the trade sector as a new venue, raising trade risks. The purpose of this study is to highlight the danger posed by TBML and the initiatives that should be taken to prevent such.
Design/methodology/approach
A review of publicly available reports, case studies, secondary data and literature on TBML from a variety of Sri Lankan and international contexts comprised the methodology. However, due to the dearth of literature on TBML details/information in the Sri Lankan context, international case studies have been analyzed. More critically, there are no precise estimates of TBML or defined protocols for collecting and maintaining TBML data. As a result, the FATF potential TMBL typologies were analyzed, and typical TBML procedures were examined to identify viable treats for Sri Lanka.
Findings
The study found that TBML has a significant effect on the economy and, as a result, social conflicts. Sri Lanka has the potential for TBML, and ML through financial institutions was identified as a major risk. Literature, on the other hand, shows that a large quantity of money has been laundered using TBML in Sri Lanka. The geographical location entices criminals to wash their illicit gains, and so the country has potential danger from South Asian countries. However, because of the sociopolitical climate in Sri Lanka, criminals are constantly looking for ways to profit illegally. Relaxing rules to promote foreign investment may encourage launderers to use their illicit proceeds. The government needs to take great care when dealing with this particularly delicate issue.
Research limitations/implications
Due to the complexity of financial crimes, this study had a number of limitations, as do many others. The data used for this study was sourced from publicly available information and the TBML has been clearly defined or understood due to the fact that the complexity of the methods used by criminals. As a result, the number of local instances reported on TMBL is quite small, hence this study relied on international case studies.
Originality/value
This research on TBML in Sri Lanka is original. It is anticipated that the findings and contribution of the study would help the stakeholders develop TBML prevention measures.
Crime and Punishment Tuomaala-Järvinen, Lotta; Saarinen, Juha
Perspectives on terrorism (Lowell),
10/2021, Letnik:
15, Številka:
5
Journal Article
Odprti dostop
This article provides the first-ever empirical overview of patterns of jihadist financing in Finland. As jihadism has evolved in the country, particularly during the 2010s, financing-related ...activities have become increasingly present, also developing in quality and variance. While there are no upheld convictions on terrorist financing in Finland to date, the authors have identified at least three distinct types of jihadist financing present in the country. First, assets have been raised and moved to armed jihadist groups operating in conflict zones abroad. Second, foreign fighters traveling to Syria and Iraq, predominantly to join IS, have self-financed their travel and equipment purchases, partly through illicit means, and, in at least one case, also moved assets for the benefit of the group they joined. Lastly, there have been assets raised in Finland and moved to individuals engaging in jihadist activities abroad. However, Finland faces notable challenges in investigating and prosecuting these offenses, hampering its efforts to promote criminal accountability for terrorist offenses.
The concept of financial monitoring as a set of measures carried out by the entities of primary and state financial monitoring in the field of prevention and counteraction to separatist funding ...(article 110-2 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine), legalization (laundering) of criminally obtained property (article 209 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine), and terrorism funding (article 258-5 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine) is developed and proved.
The relationship between the categories of «terrorism» and «finance» is determined in the following areas: money paid to terrorists for refusing to commit violence acts; covert funding of terrorist organizations by certain states, non-governmental organizations, and criminal groups; «money laundering» and its introduction into legal circulation; creation of own groups in commercial, credit and financial institutions by terrorist organizations; ‘launderingof money’ obtained as a result of criminal activity.
The risks in the system of prevention of terrorism and counteraction to legalization of criminally obtained proceedsare outlined. They were defined as the following: non-transparent funding of political parties; the share of cash resources addressed to the mentioned criminal activity; «outflow» of capital; absence of a clearly defined sectoral risk assessment of the entities of primary financial monitoring in the field of prevention and counteraction to legalization (laundering) of criminally obtained proceeds.
It is offered to include the risk of terrorism and separatism funding through deposit-taking corporations tobanking risks.
An attempt has been made to accumulate the majority of the latest achievements (as legislative, theoretical and research aswell as applied ones) on the issues of legal regulation of the studied procedural, financial and legal relations, on the basis of which scientific views are proved and proposals for improving regulations in this area are worked out.
Keywords: monitoring, banks, covert investigative actions, bank accounts monitoring, terrorism funding, banking risks, financial and legal relations.
JEL Classification E42, E52, G28, K13, K14
Formulas: 0; fig.: 1; tabl.: 0; bibl.: 16.
Purpose
The purpose of this article is to determine how terrorist financiers have continued to exploit hawala banking in German-speaking countries, despite regulations in place to prohibit this.
...Design/methodology/approach
The first author interviewed compliance officers and suspected criminals on hawala banking mechanisms. Formal interviews with compliance officers were recorded, but interviews with suspected criminals were not, to maximize their potential forthrightness. The number of interviews totaled to 70 and a questionnaire was based on this that was sent to 200 compliance officers. The interviews were analyzed with a qualitative analysis and developed a system of categories that, in turn, was assessed by means of triangulation. These interviews enabled the first author to translate the empirical findings into his own recommendations for improving regulatory procedures prohibiting the financing of terrorism.
Findings
The paper finds that it is possible to circumvent compliance measures and exploit hawala banking to finance terrorism. Compliance officers consider the chances of detecting terrorist financing to be “low,” which is illustrated by mapping out the individual steps of the asset transfer. The conducted interviews enabled the first author to translate the empirical findings into his own recommendations for improving regulatory procedures prohibiting the financing of terrorism.
Research limitations/implications
The scope of application of results was duly considered.
Originality/value
Whilst the existing literature sufficiently connects hawala banking to terrorist financing, this article details how existing compliance measures are circumvented. Emergent policies must consider the current vulnerabilities to improve their effectiveness.
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