Christine Swanton offers a new, comprehensive theory of virtue ethics which addresses the major concerns of modern ethical theory from a character-based perspective. The book departs in significant ...ways from classical virtue ethics and neo-Aristotelianism, employing insights from Nietzsche and other sources, resulting in a highly distinctive and original brand of virtue ethics.
This paper describes differences in two perspectives on the idea of virtue as a theoretical foundation for positive organizational ethics (POE). The virtue ethics perspective is grounded in the ...philosophical tradition, has classical roots, and focuses attention on virtue as a property of character. The positive social science perspective is a recent movement (e.g., positive psychology and positive organizational scholarship) that has implications for POE. The positive social science movement operationalizes virtue through an empirical lens that emphasizes virtuous behaviors. From a virtue ethics perspective, a behaviorally based account of virtue is a weak theory of virtue. Observations are suggested for integrating the two perspectives. First, virtue should always be understood as an excellence and is often an optimal point between extreme dysfunctions on continuum of potential states. Second, an empirical exploration of virtue needs to account for character and context. Finally, the properties of organization-level virtue need to be further specified and explored. Implications and directions for future research are discussed.
This paper discusses the nature of Confucian ethics and its tense relations with modernity through analysing the arguments contained in Chen Lai’s 陈来 Confucian Theory of Virtue. The author points out ...that Confucian ethical theory is a kind of virtue ethics and that the distinction between public virtue and private virtue in modern moral projects necessarily leads to the elimination of the latter by the former. This is a general predicament of virtue ethics faced by modern societies.
Situationists (e.g., Doris in Lack of character: personality and moral behavior, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
2002
; Harman in Proc Aristot Soc 99:315–331,
1999
.
...https://doi.org/10.2307/4545312
), with reference to empirical work in psychology, have called into question the predictive and explanatory power of character traits and on this basis have criticized the empirical adequacy of moral virtue. More recently, Alfano (Philos Q 62(247):223–249,
2012
; Character as moral fiction, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
2013
) has extended the situationist critique from virtue ethics to virtue epistemology. On the line he advances, virtue responsibilism—the view that intellectual character traits play an important part in traditional and untraditional epistemological inquiries—is criticized as empirically inadequate in light of the extent to which individuals are shown to be susceptible to seemingly trivial and epistemically irrelevant situational influences. Alfano’s attempted redeployment of the situationist challenge to virtue responsibilism is on closer inspection not as straightforward as he claims. It is granted that the empirical adequacy of virtue responsibilism will be eventually threatened if it can be shown that virtuous motivation is, in light of situational factors, causally ineffective. As it turns out, various psychological studies which situationists have overlooked, suggest that virtuous motivation is causally efficacious in a way that favours the position of the virtue responsibilist over the situationist. In the first part of this paper, I outline the hard core of virtue theory: both a rich motivation requirement, and a commitment to the inherent relation between virtue and a good life; then I assess whether these are undermined by situationist criticism. I address the confusion of the existing debate, and the conclusion drawn is that virtue theory ultimately remains unscathed. In the second part of my paper I defend the empirical adequacy of virtue theory based on self-determination theory. When we afford closer attention to studies on the orientation of our motivation, it becomes clear how the dynamics of our motivation have a tremendous influence on desirable behavioural outcomes: a good life.
A Christian Education in the Virtues examines the connection between human nature and human flourishing. It draws on ancient and medieval sources to explore the formation of the person based on a ...Christian anthropology, emphasising the communal nature of the virtuous life and provides a richer approach to the question of contemporary character education. The book argues that the only way to understand and construct our character virtues is to have a clear picture of what is the purpose and meaning of human life. It highlights the importance of engaging with moral issues and makes the case that, for Christian educators, human flourishing is inseparable from God’s active relationship to human beings. The book also explores a teleological approach to character education goals. To educate the whole person in the light of an all-embracing Christian worldview is challenged by secular and liberal ideology and is often seen as irrational to the modern mind. Overall, the text seeks to demonstrate that many aspects of a Neo-Aristotelian-Thomist theoretical underpinning for Christian character education holds out a viable option for Christians. It therefore argues the case for the educational potential of Christian character education. This important book will be essential reading for academics, researchers and students in the fields of character and virtue education, religious education and the philosophy of education. The Open Access version of this book, available at www.taylorfrancis.com/books/oa-mono/10.4324/9781003141877, has been made available under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives 4.0 license.
One of the most pressing challenges facing virtue theorists is the conflation problem. This problem concerns the difficulty of explaining the distinction between different types of virtue, such as ...the distinction between moral virtues and intellectual virtues. Julia Driver has argued that only an outcomes-based understanding of virtue can provide an adequate solution to the conflation problem. In this paper, I argue against Driver's outcomes-based account, and propose an alternative motivations-based solution. According to this proposal, intellectual virtues can be identified by the shared motivation for cognitive contact with reality, while moral virtues are identified by appeal to the characteristic motivations of kindness and justice. I defend the proposal by demonstrating that it produces plausible verdicts concerning the virtue status of candidate moral and intellectual virtues.
As founder of modern political economics and prominent theorist of the commercial society, Adam Smith’s importance is universally recognized. Little, however, has been done so far to develop Adam ...Smith’s virtue ethics in the context of modern business, characterized by digitalization. This article aims to rediscover Adam Smith’s virtue of prudence and its relevance for the “e-commercial society”: It presents a framework that considers the central place of prudence in the relationship between a prosperous e-commercial system and societal flourishing. In Smith’s view of the commercial society, prudence enables people to develop habits of character related to industriousness, genuineness, spirit of sacrifice, and self-command, which help in the conduct of a prosperous business activity. This article translates Smith’s virtue of prudence into a language typical of consumers in the current e-commerce scenario, considering their development as persons and the contribution of their activities to the good of society.
Negative terms are widespread in the text of Laozi; however, our understanding of their field, form and philosophical meaning is still unclear. In this paper, I intend to argue that the theoretical ...meaning of these terms first needs to be understood in terms of the proposition “Truthful words seem contrary”. In this proposition, “contrary” is the accurate meaning of negative terms. I demonstrate that the essence of the “contrary” lies in the critical reaction of xuande (dark virtue) to mingde (brilliant virtue), which is the traditional highest value. Thus, dark virtue is the theoretical foundation of the “contrary” because it is the new highest value. The “contrary” manifests itself in two forms: intuitive words (including adjectives and nouns), which are reflective, and negative words (including negative adverbs and verbs). Intuitive words represent the highest value or Being by means of the states and beings in the empirical world (I make use of the ontological difference between Being and being made by Heidegger, and so I maintain the capitalization of Being). In contrast, negative words more clearly distinguish the highest value or Being from secular values and beings in negative sentences. According to a further analysis of the relationship between affirmative and negative sentences, the latter is the universal expression of the former. All of these propositions reveal a philosophical possibility in which the diverse ways and values of the existence of all beings are affirmed and fulfilled.
PDF
