Autor propituje misaoni eksperiment »vela neznanja« i načela pravednosti Johna Rawlsa putem dvaju glavnih smjerova kritike. Prvo, iako Rawls konstruira veo neznanja kantovskim kategorijama, autor izvodi Rawlsovu motivaciju iz poveznice pravednosti s tradicijom obuzdavanja pleoneksične ljudske prirode, tvrdeći da je u tom kontekstu Rawlsova kantovska retorika zapravo pogonjena hobsovskim strahom od nestabilnosti koji proizlazi iz problema suradnje u tradiciji društvenog ugovora. Drugo, veo neznanja lukavi je instrument privilegiranih za očuvanje prethodno stečenih prednosti, kontrolu stabilnosti i prikrivanje društveno-političkih nepravdi. Pri tome, načelo razlike koje iz njega proizlazi ne umanjuje jaz nejednakosti – ekonomskih i povijesnih – nego ga legitimira i utvrđuje. Zapravo, Rawlsov buržoaski liberalizam i njegovi teorijski konstrukti služe hedgiranju bolje stojećih osiguravajući im i uvećavajući ono što već imaju. The author examines the “veil of ignorance” thought experiment and the principles of justice of John Rawls via two main directions of criticism. First, although Rawls constructs a veil of ignorance with Kantian categories, the author derives Rawls’s motivation from the link between justice and the tradition of curbing pleonexic human nature, arguing that in this context Rawls’s Kantian rhetoric is actually driven by the Hobbesian fear of instability arising from the problem of cooperation in the social contract tradition. Second, the veil of ignorance is a cunning instrument of the privileged to preserve their previously acquired advantages, control stability, and cover up socio-political injustices. At the same time, the principle of difference that derives from it does not reduce the gap of inequality – economic and historical – but legitimizes and establishes it. In fact, Rawls’s bourgeois liberalism and its theoretical constructs serve to hedge the well-off by securing and increasing what they already have.