U suvremenoj filozofskoj literaturi vlada pro-emocionalni konsenzus povodom pitanja o odnosu emocija i praktične racionalnosti. Njegovi zagovornici emocijama pripisuju svojstva strateški racionalnih stanja, koja pozitivno utječu na kognitivni mehanizam racionalne deliberacije i navode subjekta na odabir onih radnji koje su za njega praktično korisne. U ovom ćemo radu analizirati osnovna tvrđenja pro-emocionalnog konsenzusa i razmotriti njihovu istinitost u svjetlu tri ključna prigovora tezi o strateškoj racionalnosti emocija. Pokazat ćemo da se emocije, unatoč njihovoj tendenciji da izazivaju epizode impulzivnosti i samoobmane, mogu opravdano nazvati strateški racionalnim, ali da zagovornici pro-emocionalnog konsenzusa moraju biti oprezni kada potporu svojim uvjerenjima traže u tezi o modularnosti emocija i evolucijskim objašnjenjima praktične korisnosti njihovih funkcija. There is a growing pro-emotional consensus in contemporary literature on the relationship between emotions and practical rationality. Its proponents argue that emotions exhibit the properties of strategically rational states, i.e. that they can positively influence the cognitive mechanism of rational deliberation and lead an individual to choose an action based on its practical utility. In this paper, we will analyse the main claims of this consensus and examine their plausibility in light of three critical objections to the strategic rationality thesis. We will demonstrate that emotions, despite their tendency to trigger episodes of impulsivity and selfdeception, can rightly be described as strategically rational, with the caveat that proponents of the pro-emotional consensus must exercise caution when attempting to support their beliefs with the thesis of the modularity of emotions and the evolutionary explanations for their practical utility.