U članku razmatramo prigovore pristupa sposobnosti upućene Rawlsovoj teoriji pravednosti. Prigovor je da Rawlsova teorija isključivim fokusom na razložnost i racionalnost, kao na esencijalna svojstva osoba koje su obuhvaćene opsegom pravednosti, isključuje iz njezine domene ljude koji ta svojstva ne posjeduju (poput osoba s teškim mentalnim oštećenjima). Ukazujemo na nedostatke alternativnog prijedloga teorije sposobnosti koji je utemeljen na dostojanstvu vrste jer tvrdimo da taj pojam ne može utemeljiti valjane normativne zaključke. Prihvaćamo Rawlsovu ideju da sadržaje pravednosti, prije svega prava, određuju razložni ljudi (idealni zakonodavci). Međutim, smatramo da sadržaje pravednosti ne utvrđuju imajući u vidu samo svoje apstraktne karakteristike racionalnih i razložnih bića, nego raznolika prava i sposobnosti. S obzirom na svoju osobinu razložnosti, koja pretpostavlja nepristranost, utvrđuju prava i sposobnosti koje treba zaštititi univerzalno. Na taj su način i bića koja nemaju sposobnost racionalnosti i razložnosti obuhvaćena u doseg pravednosti. In the article, we consider the objections of the capability approach to Rawls’s theory of public justification. The objection is that Rawls’s theory is considered with an exclusive focus on reason and rationality as essential properties of justice, excluding from the domain of justice people who do not possess these properties (such as people with severe cognitive impairments). We point out the shortcomings of the alternative proposal to the capability theory, which is based on the dignity of the species, because we claim that no valid normative conclusions can be derived from the concept of the species. We conclude by adopting a model of public justification according to which duties and rights are determined by reasonable people (ideal legislators). Reasonable people impartially judge the principles of justice even for those who do not participate in the process of justification but deserve the recognition of rights by universalizing these rights. Through universalization, they justified these rights for themselves and for those they represented by presenting adequate representatives in the process of justifying the principles of justice for those who do not have the capability to be reasonable and rational.