U radu se ispituje mogućnost reprezentiranja Aristotelove rasprave o singularnoj predikaciji iz Kategorija 10, 13b27-35 u trima simboličkim idiomima – u jeziku logike prvog reda s identitetom, s i bez određenih opisa, te jezicima slobodnih logika – te se pokazuje zašto nijedna reprezentacija nije u potpunosti odgovarajuća. Prema prvoj opciji, obvezujemo Aristotela na (meta)logičke implikacije koje on ne prihvaća. Prema drugoj opciji, pripisujemo Aristotelu Russellovu teoriju imena. U konačnici, treća nas opcija ostavlja s pretpostavkom da se ‘postoji’ može reprezentirati predikatom. Takvu pretpostavku, međutim, Aristotel izričito odbija. The possibility of formal representation of Aristotle’s discussion about singular predication in Categories 10, 13b27-35 is investigated through three symbolic idioms: the first-order language with identity, with and without definitive description, and through the languages of free logics. I show that such representations are not fully adequate. According to the first option, we are committing Aristotle with some (meta)logical implications he is not willing to accept. According to the second option, we are burdening Aristotle with Russell’s theory of names. Finally, the third option leaves us with the assumption that ‘exist(s)’ could be represented with a predicate. This assumption, however, Aristotle emphatically rejects.