The decision to engage in corruption-public and private corruption, nepotism, and embezzlement-is often attributed to rational actors maximizing benefits to themselves. However, the importance of reciprocal relationships in humans suggests that an actor may weigh the costs of harms of her corrupt behavior to individuals who may generate future benefits for her. We hypothesize that actors who have a larger circle of actual and potential social partners will have more individuals to consider when generating harms and will thus be less likely to find corrupt acts permissible than actors with smaller circles of valued others. Using data from the World Values Survey and European Values Study (WVS), we explore whether participants with a larger geographic identity or a greater number of group memberships (i.e. a larger scope of actual and potential social partners) are less likely to find accepting bribes permissible. We find mixed support for our hypotheses, but consistently find that WVS participants with local, country, continent, or world geographic identities are less likely to find accepting a bribe permissible than those with regional identities-that is, actors whose primary identities that encompass more than their region find corruption less permissible. We discuss the importance of considering an actor's valuation of others when modeling corruption persistence, noting that establishing scopes of positive valuation is a precursor to predicting where actors will target benefits and shunt costs.